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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In most countries, financial systems are pro-cyclical. Credit to the non-financial private 
sector typically increases when output is expanding and contracts during recessions, while 
asset prices respond to favorable growth expectations. Pro-cyclicality is a normal 
consequence of the process through which the financial system finances economic growth. 
However, the experience of some emerging markets and OECD countries, where rapid credit 
growth and asset price bubbles have preceded sharp cyclical downturns, often accompanied 
by episodes of financial instability, suggests that features of the financial system can 
exacerbate the cycle. Interest in this issue has been heightened by the strong output growth 
coupled with rapid credit growth and asset price inflation in many Asian countries. This has 
contributed to concerns that a build-up of risk in financial systems could exacerbate the 
cyclical downturn, as it did in a number of countries in 1997-8. This paper identifies features 
of financial systems that have the potential to exacerbate pro-cyclicality and empirically 
assesses their importance for eleven East Asian economies, five of which are “advanced” 
(Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore) and six are “emerging market 
economies” (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand). 
A relatively broad concept of pro-cyclicality may be needed to encompass the experiences of 
many emerging markets. The traditional concept, where real credit and output growth and 
other variables move together in a relatively smooth fashion over the cycle, is based on the 
experiences of industrial countries with stable financial systems (Borio et al 2001). In some 
emerging markets, the experience has been somewhat different, with sharper and more 
sudden simultaneous falls in credit, output and asset prices often associated with financial 
instability. Accordingly, a broad concept would need to take into account the contribution of 
structural weaknesses in financial systems to pro-cyclicality. It can build on the extensive 
empirical research showing that recessions in emerging market, developing and some 
industrial countries are sometimes associated with sharp falls in asset prices, especially 
property prices, and financial instability.  
Pro-cyclicality is a normal feature of economic systems. It reflects a process where credit 
expansion support economic growth and asset prices rise to facilitate an efficient allocation 
of resources. It relies on a sound, well-functioning financial system that accommodates the 
changing demand for credit over the cycle. The provision of credit over the cycle reflects the 
response of the financial system to information asymmetries (discussed in the literature on 
the “financial accelerator”). Since this represent an effective response of sound financial 
institutions to risks created by imperfect information, it is unlikely to exacerbate pro-
cyclicality sufficiently to generate financial or macroeconomic stability. Rather, it is 
necessary to look to the structure and dynamics of financial systems to identify features or 
weaknesses that could substantially exacerbate pro-cyclicality and test for their significance. 
 
The literature highlights a range of structural features that could exacerbate pro-cyclicality. 
They can arise from shortcomings in bank risk management or supervision, or shifts in the 
availability in foreign bank and non-bank finance and tend to become more influential with 
financial liberalization. Inadequate risk management, for example, is reflected in excessive 
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reliance on collateral, which may not adequately limit credit risk, rather than on an evaluation 
of the repayment capacity of borrowers. Also, banks’ credit assessment capacity may become 
stretched during episodes of rapid credit growth as the volume of new loans increases sharply 
so that the credit quality of new loans worsens. Banks that cannot adequately estimate default 
risk over the cycle are also more likely to underprice credit risk. These features make 
financial systems more prone to unsustainable surges in credit growth and a build up in credit 
risk, which when the credit risk materializes can contribute to credit crunches. 
Weaknesses in supervision allow a build up of risk in the system that ultimately exacerbates 
pro-cyclicality. When adverse shocks and/or weak credit assessment lead to a deterioration in 
asset quality, forbearance allows banks to continue lending and accumulating non-
performing loans (NPLs). A failure to enforce provisioning means that the losses are not 
reflected in capital, which reduces its disciplinary role. While this can lessen pro-cyclicality 
in the short run, it usually increases it in the long run because forbearance is usually 
unsustainable. As NPLs accumulate, they pose a growing threat to financial stability, and 
supervisors are forced to act to avoid a financial crisis. This can involve requiring banks to 
recognize and provision against losses and to raise capital ratios and restructuring weak or 
insolvent banks. This exacerbates procyclicality as banks often respond by restructuring their 
balance sheets to raise their capital adequacy ratio by reducing lending. When banks cannot 
raise new capital because they are perceived as risky, they must reduce risk-weighted assets 
by cutting loans and holding more zero-weighted government securities. 
Features of financial systems such as bank ownership structure and the importance of non-
bank sources of finance can also influence how credit is provided over the cycle. Foreign 
banks and state-owned banks can influence the cycle, because their response to it differs 
from private domestic banks. Reliance on international interbank financing can allow banks 
to lend beyond the domestic deposit base but entail liquidity risks because this funding 
source is highly sensitive to changes in counterparty credit risk. Thus, if the credit quality of 
banks is perceived to deteriorate in a cyclical downturn, this can result in a loss of interbank 
funding for some banks forcing them to sharply reduce lending, as illustrated by the 1997 
crisis. The availability of non-bank sources of funds can influence the cycle because of the 
scope it provides borrowers to shift among funding sources.  
 
The empirical analysis in the paper tests for the importance of the factors driving pro-
cyclicality in 11 Asian countries. It finds that pro-cyclicality among property prices, credit 
growth and GDP is strong but asymmetric. The much higher correlations in cyclical 
downturns is consistent with financial instability playing a role in procyclicality. This 
analysis also shows that asset prices and credit growth have in the past undergone large 
deviations from trend and occasionally exceeded thresholds associated with financial 
instability in many countries. Panel estimation using macro data for Asian countries and 
bank-level data for almost 300 Asian banks found that structural features of Asian financial 
systems have been significant sources of pro-cyclicality. In particular, developments in the 
property sector, provisioning policies and a compression of lending margins contribute 
strongly to the pro-cyclicality of credit. There is also evidence that for banks in emerging 
markets, credit assessment becomes less effective as the lessons learned in the last downturn 
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fade. Foreign banks have offsetting effects, while their subsidiaries behave less pro-cyclically 
than domestic banks, the interbank funding they provide contributes to pro-cyclicality.  
In sections II and III this paper illustrates the extent of procyclicality in Asian financial 
systems and identifies a variety of financial factors that can exacerbate pro-cyclicality, 
drawing on the extensive available literature (which does not however focus specifically on 
these economies). Section IV reviews qualitative information on the extent to which certain 
structural features that may contribute to pro-cyclicality are present in each East Asian 
country’s financial system. Section V tests for the importance of the different potential 
sources of pro-cyclicality in Asian financial systems using several econometric models. 
Section VI concludes with a discussion of prudential and monetary policies that countries 
could use to avoid excessive pro-cyclicality. 
 
Box 1. Sources of Pro-Cyclicality Originating in the Structure of Financial Systems 
 
1. Excessive reliance on collateral to mitigate credit risk 
2. Delayed recognition of, and provisioning for, NPLs and regulatory forbearance  
3. Underpricing of credit risk so that lending margins that are too narrow to cover the risk 
4. Deterioration in the quality of credit assessment during cyclical upswings 
5. Directed lending by state-owned bank and connected lending 
6. Bank reliance on volatile foreign sources of funding  
7. Financial liberalization 
 
II.   FEATURES OF PRO-CYCLICALITY IN ASIA 
The extent of pro-cyclicality in Asia can be assessed based on the correlation of real GDP 
growth, real credit growth and the change in real property prices. GDP is the standard 
variable used to measure of the business cycle, while real credit growth reflects the role of 
the financial sector in the cycle. Property prices are the most relevant asset price because 
property is the principal form of collateral required to obtain credit. Overall, the analysis 
shows strong positive but asymmetric correlations, with higher correlations during cyclical 
downturns, although with significant differences across Asian countries.  
 
The correlations of the annual change in real credit to annual growth in GDP are often high 
(Table 1). These correlations are strong both contemporaneously and between current credit 
and GDP lagged by one year. They are consistent with pro-cyclicality but not with credit 
playing a causal role.2 To detect asymmetries in these correlations, the sample was split into 
                                                 
2
 In contrast, the correlation between credit and lagged GDP is close to zero. The finding that 
GDP leads credit is confirmed by Granger Causality tests, which are not reported due to 
space constraints. These tests also confirm the results, below, that property prices lead credit. 
Similar results are found for a group of advanced countries by Davis and Zhu (2004a). 
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periods of above or below trend GDP growth and correlations were computed for each sub-
sample. This analysis indicated that the correlation of credit to GDP is much stronger on 
average when growth is weak, suggesting that pro-cyclicality is greater in a recession 
(Table 2). This cyclical asymmetry is consistent with an environment where constraints on 
credit play a more important role in downturns than credit growth does in upturns. 
 
The results for the relationship between credit and asset prices (real house prices) are similar 
with property prices leading credit growth. Changes in property prices have a strong positive 
correlation both contemporaneously and when property prices are lagged one year, indicating 
they lead credit growth (Table 2). In contrast, property prices are only contemporaneously—
and positively—correlated with GDP (Table 3). These findings could reflect both: (i) that the 
price of property is an asset price that can adjust quickly (or “jump”) in response to shifts in 
growth-expectations (which would increase demand for property); and (ii) the important role 
property prices play in facilitating the extension of credit by increasing in the value of 
property used as collateral for this credit. 
The correlations with property prices are also asymmetric over the cycle. When the sample is 
split into periods of above and below average GDP growth, property prices are more highly 
correlated with credit in the downturn (Table 5). A striking result is that there is virtually no 
correlation between house prices and real GDP in the period of expansion but a very strong 
contemporaneous correlation in the downturn. These results are consistent with changes in 
collateral values driven by asset prices declines playing a stronger role in cyclical downturns. 
In assessing these results, it is important to bear in mind that correlations can only detect 
patterns in macro data and do not indicate causality, which needs to be assessed using 
econometric analysis. 
A.   Role of Financial Instability in Pro-Cyclicality 
There is extensive evidence that cyclical downturns are associated with episodes of financial 
instability in emerging markets. Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) used data from 38 countries 
from 1980-97, and found that banking distress is preceded by credit expansion and capital 
inflows and associated with: a sharp fall in GDP growth; rising real interest rates; declining 
bank deposits; a sharp fall in the real exchange rate, declining imports and an adverse terms-
of trade-shock. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examined 20 developed and developing 
countries from 1970-95 to assess macroeconomic variables whose behavior is systematically 
different in the period prior to banking and currency crises. Banking crises were preceded by 
recession, declines in the terms of trade, stock-market crashes, real exchange rate 
appreciation, lending booms, and increases in the money multiplier and real interest rates.  
 
Sustained credit growth and large increase in asset prices appear to contribute to pro-
cyclicality but also to increase the probability of financial instability. This makes it possible 
to use credit and asset price deviations from trend as indicators of growing financial 
vulnerability. Borio and Lowe (2002) propose a methodology to detect future financial sector 
problems by examining the behavior of credit and asset prices. Their approach—building on 
the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)—identifies thresholds for these indicators which 
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if jointly exceeded point to the risk of an asset price bubble and build up of excessive credit 
risk. Borio and Lowe calculate thresholds for the ratio of credit to GDP and the real stock 
market index using data for 34 countries for the period 1960 to 1999. They estimate the 
thresholds for credit to be 4 to 5 percent above long-run trend and for asset prices to be about 
40 to 50 percent above trend.  
Credit and asset price deviations from their long-term trend for 11 Asian countries over 1960 
to 2004 Q3 along with the Borio and Lowe thresholds are shown in Figure 1. Many countries 
were temporarily above or below both thresholds during the 1990s, implying that sharp 
changes in asset prices and credit were associated with financial instability over this period. 
Currently, most countries are below the thresholds except for Indonesia,3 where a sizeable 
credit gap of 25 percent and a moderate asset price gap of 55 percent are above the respective 
thresholds. Overall, the asset price increase seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon, as 
there is no evidence of excessive positive gaps in the recent periods, with the possible 
exception of Indonesia. 
 
III.   THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO PRO-CYCLICALITY 
Pro-cyclicality is a normal feature of macroeconomic systems in which credit expansions 
support the business cycle and contribute to economic growth, while asset prices respond to 
growth expectations and may buoy the availability of credit. This process relies on a sound 
and well functioning financial system that can meet the changing demand for credit over the 
cycle without taking on excessive risk that could threaten its solvency. A sound financial 
system, however, will not passively accommodate the demand for credit as it manages risks 
arising from imperfect information. This response affects the availability and pricing of 
credit over the cycle and is discussed in the extensive literature on the financial accelerator. 
  
The financial accelerator can add to pro-cyclicality but only to a limited extent. It should not 
lead to the macroeconomic or financial instability that can severely exacerbate pro-cyclicality 
since it reflects the effective management of risks arising from imperfect information. It 
needs to be distinguished from structural features and weaknesses in a financial system that 
can exacerbate pro-cyclicality from the supply side contributing to financial instability. There 
are a range of such features identified in the literature that can be classified according to 
whether they arise from shortcomings in bank risk management, weaknesses in supervision 
or shifts in the availability in foreign bank and non-bank finance. These features have tended 
to become more important with financial liberalization, although liberalization has also led to 
some offsetting developments such as development of securities markets that provide 
alternative sources of funds to bank credit. 
 
                                                 
3
 For the case of Indonesia, given the relatively short length of the time series, the estimation 
of the trend and cycle may suffer from a short-sample bias. 
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A.   The Financial Accelerator  
A principal channel through which the financial system influences the business cycle in the 
literature is termed the “financial accelerator” (Bernanke et. al., 1996). It derives from 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and the associated agency costs. 
Lenders try to mitigate problems arising from imperfect information by basing lending on 
collateral, borrowers’ net worth and observable cash flow. This makes the availability and 
pricing of credit more vulnerable to shocks that weaken borrowers balance sheets and 
earnings and can give rise to pro-cyclical feedback effects by affecting real expenditures.  
 
A central insight from the literature is that this role of collateral provides a mechanism 
through which asset prices can exacerbate procyclicality (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
Increasing asset prices in cyclical upswings push up collateral values, raising household 
borrowing capacity and credit growth. Conversely, in downturns this mechanism leads to a 
sharper decline in credit. 
 
The literature show that the effect is stronger for borrowers whose net worth is most heavily 
affected during cyclical downturns and whose activities are riskier or harder to monitor, such 
as smaller and new firms. It also finds that banks are more likely than markets to continue to 
provide credit to smaller and weaker borrowers during cyclical downturns. Banks are better 
able to manage problems of imperfect information and, thus, to monitor the changing risk 
profile of such borrowers. A consequence of this is that banks can influence the availability 
of market forms of finance through a signaling effect. The literature shows that the existence 
of a lending relationship is viewed by markets as a positive signal about the quality of 
borrowers.  
In sum, the financial accelerator can explain why financial systems are procyclical. However, 
it views credit cycles as largely demand driven. The role of financial institutions is modeled 
as a rational profit maximizing response to agency costs arising from imperfect information. 
Their response influences the availability and pricing of external finance in a way that 
contributes to pro-cyclicality. This, however, is unlikely to exacerbate pro-cyclicality 
sufficiently to generate macroeconomic and financial instability. It results from the financial 
system effectively doing its job in managing the risks arising from the fundamental problem 
of imperfect information.  
 
The financial accelerator implicitly assumes that banks are sound, manage risk effectively, 
and do not fail. The failure of these assumptions to hold provides scope for the supply side of 
the financial system to exacerbate pro-cyclicality. This effect, together with the weaknesses 
in the financial system, can account for the observed association between pro-cyclicality and 
macroeconomic and financial instability. It implies that other hypotheses in addition to the 
financial accelerator are needed to explain pro-cyclicality, as noted by Borio et al, (2001). 
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B.   Weaknesses in Bank Risk Management and Governance 
Excessive reliance on collateral to mitigate credit risk  
In the financial accelerator, collateral plays a key role in addressing the problems of 
imperfect information but can exacerbate pro-cyclicality. This model abstracts, however, 
from a critical feature of many financial systems, which is that the protection that collateral 
can provide is limited by the costs and legal impediments to seizing and liquidating 
collateral. Given that collateral is generally not sufficient to avoid credit risk, it needs to be 
supplemented by an assessment of whether borrowers’ also have a capacity to repay. 
Exclusive reliance on collateral (where repayment capacity is ignored) can itself be a source 
of pro-cyclicality through several channels: 
• During the cyclical upswing when collateral values are rising, banks that rely only on 
collateral are more likely to rapidly expand lending to high risk borrowers.  
• Sharp falls in the value of collateral in cyclical downturns reduces the protection it 
provides. 
• As this credit risk materializes and losses occur in the cyclical downturn, banks try to 
liquidate collateral simultaneously, which contributes to the decline in the market 
value of collateral, opening up under-collateralized credit exposures.  
• Long delays in the re-evaluation of collateral to recognize declines in asset prices can 
result in large hidden uncollateralized exposures that force banks to recognize large 
losses when revaluation occurs. 
Even when banks are fully protected by collateral, a failure to assess repayment capacity 
could exacerbate procyclicality. Loans made to borrowers without assessing their capacity to 
repay are likely to be riskier. This makes them more likely to default in a downturn, which 
would exacerbate the recession. More generally, the literature shows that property prices 
were indeed an important determinant of banks’ lending and lending margins.  
 
Deterioration in the quality of credit assessment during cyclical upswings 
 
The quality of credit assessments can deteriorate during cyclical upswings as credit growth 
accelerates. As the number of new loans increases sharply, banks’ credit assessment capacity 
become stretched so that the credit quality of loans worsens. This feature also makes 
financial systems more prone to surges in credit growth, as banks are less likely to limit 
lending growth as additional loans become increasingly risky, and credit crunches become 
more likely when the credit risk materializes. 
Another reason for the deterioration in credit assessment capacity during cyclical upswings is 
that the knowledge gained by banks during the last cyclical downturn is gradually lost with 
the departure of experienced loan officers. Also, bank management becomes less able to 
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monitor and assess quality of loan assessment as there are less problem loans on which to 
base an evaluation. The discipline of external stakeholders may weaken for similar reasons 
(i.e., a lack of observed loan performance problems).  
Evidence for this “institutional memory hypothesis” has been found by Berger and Udell 
(2003) for US banks over the 1980-2000 period, with loan growth rising and lending spreads 
narrowing as the time since the last recession increased. While this hypothesis has not been 
tested outside the US, the authors suggest that the problem is likely to be significant in 
developing countries with limited credit assessment capacity and less well-regulated banking 
systems.  
Underpricing of credit risk during cyclical upswings  
 
Borio et. al. (2001) and Lowe and Stevens (2004) argue that financial systems are good at 
pricing relative risks but may be less able to properly price the time dimension of risk. At the 
operational level, this can be reflected in a compression of lending margins during cyclical 
upturns to the point where they are insufficient to cover the credit risk on longer maturity 
loans over the cycle. Often, competitive pressures lead banks to try to maintain market share 
by lowering of credit standards and providing credit at narrower interest rate spreads. This is 
likely to be associated with abundant liquidity in a banking system, where growing deposits 
and other bank liabilities create pressures for rapid credit growth. In this situation, the risk-
adjusted rate of return is generally insufficient to cover the losses incurred by banks when 
credit risk materialize during the ensuing cyclical downturn. This can exacerbate pro-
cyclicality as these banks are likely to reduce credit more sharply than banks that priced risk 
more accurately. 
 
One source of underpricing of credit risk is estimation of the probability of default (PD) over 
time horizons that are too short relative to the effective maturity of the credit. This can lead 
to an underestimation of PD for longer-maturity assets during cyclical upswings, since PD 
tends to decline during cyclical upswings and rise in cyclical downturns. The narrow lending 
margins based on a low PD in periods of expansions will generally not be sufficient to cover 
losses when the PD rise in the ensuing downturn, which tends to weaken banks. While banks 
often try limit their risk by lending at floating interest rates or by providing short maturity 
loans that are rolled-over at regular intervals, these measures are generally insufficient. First, 
an increase in lending margins when the PD rises can push up the PD further and is unlikely 
to fully compensate for the forgone earnings when credit risk was underpriced. Second, when 
short-maturity loans are used to fund longer-maturity, multi-year projects, banks do not have 
the option of not rolling-over credits since this could precipitate a default.  
 
This source of underpricing of credit risk may be present in banks’ internal models or rating 
agency ratings used by banks to calculate the PD on loans. One reason is that banks’ internal 
risk management models must use a one-year horizon because of a lack of data on default 
rates over longer horizons (Horvath, 2002). Another is the one year accounting period over 
which banks report profits determines the time horizon over which they measure risk to 
allocate economic capital to cover it. While rating agencies in principle seek to assess credit 
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risk through the cycle, rating agencies ratings tend in practice to be pro-cyclical (Amato and 
Furfine, 2003). This means lending margins based on ratings would tend to fall during 
cyclical upturns and increase in downturns. There is evidence that ratings often react 
retrospectively to credit risk events (Mero, 2002). Specifically, rating agencies had reduced 
sovereign rating prior to financial crises in only one-quarter of the cases, suggesting that this 
source of credit risk is often underestimated (Haldane et al, 2000). 
 
More generally, an underpricing of credit risk in cyclical upswings is consistent with the 
“disaster myopia” hypothesis (Guttentag and Herring, 1984). There is substantial empirical 
evidence that the likelihood of low-probability high-risk events is underestimated and too 
much weight is given to recent events (Herring and Wachter, 1999). Borio et al (2001), 
Horvath (2002), and Banque de France (2001a and b) argue that it results because banks fail 
to fully recognize the build-up of non-diversifiable risk as their exposures increase during 
credit expansions. Davis and Zhu (2004b) found that in industrial countries loan growth had 
a negative impact on margins, which could be consistent with a weakening of credit 
standards when banks seek rapid balance sheet expansion. 
 
C.   Weaknesses in the Supervision of Banks 
Delayed recognition of, and provisioning for, NPLs and forbearance  
Delaying provisioning can lead to pro-cyclicality if risks are allowed to build up in the upturn 
but provisions are only taken when risks materialize in the subsequent downturn. This 
weakens banks, which can exacerbate pro-cyclicality by leading them to cut lending further. 
There is substantial empirical research showing that provisioning is pro-cyclical which, as 
Borio et. al. (2001) show for 10 OECD countries, explains a strong pro-cyclical pattern in 
bank profitability and credit. Studies using individual bank-level data (Cavello and Majnoni, 
2001, Laeven and Majnoni, 2003, Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004, and Davis and Zhu, 
2004b), find that: 
 
• Banks tend to delay provisioning until the deterioration of loan quality becomes 
evident during economic downturns, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
during lending booms provisioning is insufficient to cover expected loss.  
• Stronger banks with high earnings provision more, which is consistent with 
forbearance by weak banks. 
The effect of “evergreening” of loans due to regulatory forbearance can have positive or 
negative effects on pro-cyclicality depending on the time horizon and the condition of the 
banking sector. Banks that are allowed to avoid recognizing losses are less likely to contract 
credit, which would tend to lessen pro-cyclicality. However, this generally leads to a build-up 
of NPLs to a high level, progressively weakening the banking sector. Forbearance becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain and when banks’ condition deteriorates sufficiently, the threat 
of financial instability can force supervisors to act, requiring banks to recognize losses and to 
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restructure or liquidate insolvent banks. This typically leads to a sharp contraction in credit 
and fall in output, contributing to pro-cyclicality.   
Bank balance sheet restructuring triggered by credit losses  
When banks incur losses, they seek to limit the impact on their capital ratio by restructuring 
their balance sheet to reduce risk weighted assets (in the denominator). This occurs because 
banks find it difficult to raise new capital when they have been weakened by losses. They 
often do this by reducing high risk-weighted loans with zero-weighted government securities. 
When widespread, this contraction in lending can contribute to a “credit crunch.” There is an 
extensive evidence showing that the US credit crunch of the early 1990s was exacerbated by 
tighter capital requirements (Peek and Rosengren, 1995). More recently, Chiuri et al (2001) 
found a similar pattern when Basel ratios were introduced in Emerging Market Economies. 
 
D.   Role of Alternative Sources of Funding 
Availability of alternative sources of funding  
In financial systems with multiple sources of finance borrowers that lose access to securities 
markets can obtain funding from banks or, conversely, when banks experience problems and 
cut lending they can turn to securities markets. This implies that the absence of alternative 
sources of funding could make financial systems more pro-cyclical. The absence of well-
developed securities market is a feature of many emerging markets, especially in Asia 
(Roldos et. al., 2004). Evidence that this mechanism is not operative in emerging markets is 
provided by Davis and Stone (2004). They found that a banking or currency crisis had a 
positive effect on corporate bond issuance in OECD countries but a negative effect in 
emerging markets.  
 
Foreign interbank funding  
 
In some Asian countries, banks rely significantly on funding from the international interbank 
market, making their lending vulnerable to shifts in the availability of these funds (Table 7). 
These shifts tend to be pro-cyclical because the market is relatively sensitive to perceived 
changes in counterparty credit risk so bank borrowers are more likely to lose access when 
their financial condition deteriorates in a cyclical downturn. Bernard and Bisignano (2000) 
document that banks in many emerging market depend on the international interbank market 
for funding. This is consistent with the finding that changes in capital flows have a strong 
effect on credit growth, and thus tend to be pro-cyclical (as found by Kaminsky et al, 2004).  
 
E.   Factors Relating to the Structure of the Financial System 
Directed lending by state-owned banks and connected lending  
Connected lending channels credit to related parties without regard for the associated credit 
risk. This both fuels more rapid credit growth during cyclical upswings and increases the 
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likelihood of defaults in cyclical downturns, which could exacerbate the downturn. Also, 
borrowers without privileged access to credit are more likely to lose it in downturns, which 
could also contribute to procyclicality. Evidence for these effects is limited, however, due to 
the difficulties identifying and measuring connected lending. 
 
State ownership can have positive or negative effects on pro-cyclicality depending on the 
time horizon and the condition of the banking sector. State-owned banks are generally better 
able to maintain lending in cyclical downturns, but the build up of credit risk can exacerbate 
the downturn when the government is forced to bail-out or restructure insolvent state banks. 
Also, government effects to maintain credit to state-owned enterprises can reduce the 
availability of credit to the private sector in a downturn. Finally, directed lending by 
governments to support unviable state-owned enterprises can build up a contingent fiscal 
liability, setting the stage for a fiscal crisis that can threaten the banking system. Mian (2003) 
showed that across a large sample of countries, state banks in emerging market economies 
run at a loss on average, despite having lower deposit costs than private banks (due to state 
guarantees). They have significantly lower capital ratios and higher loan loss and 
provisioning rates than private banks, consistent with the hypothesis that their lending 
decisions are often not based on credit risk assessment.  
 
The role of foreign banks  
Foreign banks play an important role in many Asian countries (Table 7), but their impact on 
the pro-cyclicality of credit may vary across countries and by bank. Some foreign banks may 
be “fair weather lenders” that provide substantial credit during cyclical upturns but withdraw 
in downturns, often because of the sharp rise in country risk. In other countries, international 
bank subsidiaries and branches may maintain lending, taking advantage of the fact they are 
inherently more diversified and so less vulnerable to the downturn than domestic banks.  
 
De Haas and van Lelyveld (2003) show that in Eastern Europe, foreign banks are less likely 
to reduce credit in a downturn, although this role was influenced by the health of the parent 
bank. Mian (2003) shows that foreign banks tend to hold more liquidity than domestic banks 
and to lend to lower risk borrowers. They also tend to reduce credit by less in response to 
domestic macro shocks to the local corporate sector. Crystal et al. (2002) focusing on foreign 
banks in Latin America, found that average loan growth was consistently higher and less 
volatile, which should reduce pro-cyclicality. Foreign banks were also found to maintain 
higher risk-adjusted capital ratios and to be more aggressive in provisioning. Detragiache and 
Gupta (2004) compared the performance of domestic banks and a long-established group of 
foreign banks during the recent crisis in Malaysia. They found that the sharpest differences 
are between banks mainly active in Asia (including all domestic and some foreign banks) and 
foreign banks not specialized in Asia. The latter group performed better than the rest during 
the crisis, maintaining higher profitability thanks to higher interest margins and lower non-
performing loans. Foreign banks did not abandon the local market during the crisis and 
received less government support than domestic institutions. On balance, the evidence seems 
to suggest that foreign banks behave less procyclically than domestic banks. 
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Financial liberalization 
Financial liberalization reduces restrictions on expansion of credit and entry of foreign banks 
and, thus, can contribute to pro-cyclicality by enhancing the impact of the factors identified 
above. O’Brien and Browne (1992) argued that more intense competition between banks 
arising from liberalization may induce banks to be more responsive to changing cyclical 
conditions and perceptions of risk, making credit more pro-cyclical. Similarly, the greater 
scope for cyclical asset price movements should contribute to the pro-cyclicality of credit 
through their effect on collateral values. Habermeier et. al. (2002) shows that financial 
liberalization in emerging markets with weak financial sectors has been associated with 
financial instability, which has tended to exacerbate pro-cyclicality. On the other hand, 
abolition of credit controls, development of securities markets, and removal of barriers 
segmenting types of financial business, could lead to the development of substitutes for bank 
credit (Romer and Romer, 1990), lessening pro-cyclicality.  
 
IV.   METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF PRO-CYCLICALITY IN ASIA 
The ultimate objective of the empirical analysis is to assess the extent to which the different 
factors identified above may be exacerbating pro-cyclicality so that policies can be developed 
to limit the risks to macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, two 
complementary types of information are needed to assess the importance of the factors 
driving pro-cyclicality in Asian financial systems:  
• Qualitative information on bank risk management, supervision, and financial 
structure drawn from published Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSAs) and 
other sources to determine whether the factors identified above have been present in 
Asian countries; 
• Econometric analysis using macro data and a panel of bank-level data for almost 300 
Asian banks to test the empirical importance of the different factors identified above. 
Qualitative information on the supervisory regime and financial infrastructure in different 
countries can show whether these factors may have been, or are, present in a country. This 
makes it possible to identify the specific policy measures to limit pro-cyclicality in a country. 
Qualitative information, however, cannot by itself reveal the importance of each factor as a 
source of pro-cyclicality. For this, econometric estimates of the impact of different factor on 
pro-cyclicality are needed. Accordingly, the next section summaries the qualitative 
information that can be obtained from FSSAs, while subsequent section report estimation 
results based on a panel of macroeconomic and bank-level covering the 11 Asian countries.  
V.   PRESENCE OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PRO-CYCLICALITY IN ASIAN COUNTRIES 
To determine which factors identified above are contributing to pro-cyclicality in Asian 
countries, comprehensive and reliable qualitative information on the financial system and 
quality of supervision is needed. This is available for the six Asian countries have had 
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Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs)—Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, 
the Philippines and Singapore. For these countries, is should be possible to identify specific 
policies that can be precisely targeted at the factors exacerbating pro-cyclicality. For the 
other 5 Asian countries—Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand—information 
is available from central bank Financial Stability Reports, where available, and other official 
publications. Since this information sometimes does not cover specific factors or is relatively 
general, it is considerably more difficult to identify and prioritize appropriate polices to limit 
risks from pro-cyclicality.4  
 
Space constraints prevent discussion of specific countries but analysis of the available 
information yields conclusions about the relative importance of different factors. Overall, 
there is a clear difference between the developed and emerging market countries. For the 
former—Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore—few of the factors 
exacerbating pro-cyclicality are present. The one factor that appears to be present in all of 
them is the tendency for banks to assess risk over relatively short horizons, which can lead to 
underpricing of risk in cyclical upswings. Also, in several of them banks may have relied 
excessively on property collateral, although in each case supervisors have taken steps to 
ensure that lending decisions also take into account borrowers capacity to repay. There is no 
evidence that alternative avenues of finance have helped dampen pro-cyclicality in either 
developed or emerging market countries, reflecting limited capital market development. 
 
Among the emerging market economies, a number of factors exacerbating pro-cyclicality 
have been important. First, lending has been largely collateral based, although in several 
countries supervisors are working to ensure that lending decisions take into account the 
capacity to repay. Second, there are indications that the credit assessment capacity of many 
banks in these countries is limited, increasing the risks from rapid credit growth. Third, in 
many of the countries, banks have been allowed to delay recognition of NPLs and  
provisioning against them, allowing credit risk to build up undetected. Fourth, in several 
countries, some credit decisions have been based on directed lending by state-owned banks 
and connected lending, which also can lead to a build-up of unrecognized credit risk. Finally, 
all of these countries liberalized their financial systems over the last 10 years and 
experienced episodes of rapid credit growth.  
 
Authorities in Asian Countries are aware of many of these weaknesses and some have taken 
steps to address these. In countries with FSAPs, they were often taken in response to codes 
and standards assessments. They range from measures focused on limiting risks in the 
property sector to fundamental reform of financial sector oversight. Space constraints do not 
permit a systematic review of measures in each country but a few examples reveal the scope 
of these activities. Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and several other countries have introduced 
measures targeted at the real estate sector that include; income thresholds for borrowers; 
                                                 
4
 Several of these countries have scheduled or are considering FSAPs, which should improve 
the quality of information and allow better calibrated policy recommendations. 
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haircuts on collateral; limits on leverage (e.g., maximum loan to value ratio); and mortgage 
insurance. Another example, is the Australian authorities’ measures to strengthen the capital 
framework covering mortgage lending, increasing regulatory capital requirement for 
mortgage insurers and the risk sensitivity of regulatory capital to real estate prices. 
A number of countries have had to take more comprehensive measures to strengthen bank 
loan classification and provisioning systems and rules governing collateral. For example, 
measures taken by Korea include strengthening rules limiting connected lending; requiring 
use of “forward looking criteria” in loan evaluation; more critical assessment of collateral; 
and tightened provisioning requirements on loans to households through credit cards. 
Thailand, Indonesia and China have taken steps to strengthen loan classification and 
provisioning rules. China has recently made fundamental reforms aimed at strengthening 
oversight, including established the China Banking Regulatory Commission with a clear 
mandate and operational independence. In sum, significant progress is being made in 
strengthening regulation and supervision in some countries but implementation remain a 
major challenge. 
VI.   EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
The quantitative analysis to assess the importance of difference factors is based on earlier 
empirical studies that assess the determinants of bank performance (such as Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2001), Bikker and Hu (2002) and Davis and Zhu (2004b)). They use standard 
macroeconomic variables that capture demand-side influences on pro-cyclicality together 
with a variety of financial variables, including standard bank-specific variables, that capture 
supply side effects. The analysis is done using two different panel data sets covering the 
Asian countries as a group:  
 
• A macro data panel composed of macro data for which a long time series of quarterly 
data are available, which allows an analysis of the long run determinants of pro-
cyclical real aggregate credit growth.  
• A micro, bank-level, data panel using annual data for roughly 300 banks, which 
permits testing of specific hypotheses about the sources of pro-cyclicality through 
estimation of three specifications with different individual-bank level dependent 
variables that capture different aspects of procyclicality: (i) bank loan growth, (ii) 
bank lending margins over money market rates in each country; and (iii) bank 
provisioning rates.  
The specifications are described in more detail below, as well as the detailed results. Here we 
provide a brief summary of some of the key results: 
• Macro model results show that the housing price contributes to pro-cyclical credit 
growth, reflecting the impact of the change in collateral values in lending. The model 
also finds non-linear effects, providing support for the view that rapid growth in 
housing prices can lead to credit booms, which can be quickly reversed when the 
property price bubble busts causing a sharp fall in credit. 
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• There is also evidence of a sharper correction in credit growth for large deviations 
from its equilibrium level, implying financial instability is playing a role in pro-
cyclicality because large corrections would tend to occur during such episodes 
• Micro model results imply weak credit analysis as indicated inter alia by the fact 
rising property prices (and collateral values) lowers provisioning rates, compresses 
lending margins and raises lending implying that collateral is used as a substitute for 
credit assessment. Furthermore lending margins narrow as credit and GDP growth 
increase. 
• Credit quality deteriorates during cyclical upswings; as the number of years since a 
downturn increases, lending margins narrow, and credit growth increases, both of 
which imply deterioration in the quality of risk assessment 
• There is evidence of weaknesses in supervision and forbearance as indicated by the 
fact that less profitable banks provision less. This effect is absent in advanced 
countries, where supervision is stronger. Losses lead banks to cut loans in order to 
raise the capital ratio and a fall in the capital ratio is associated with a cut in lending. 
This procyclical effect is stronger for advanced countries 
• The provisioning rate is procyclical; growth in GDP, credit, and property prices lower 
provisioning. Such procyclical provisioning reflects weak risk management and 
supervision as banks with high capital ratios provision more 
• Foreign offshore interbank funding is a source of pro-cyclicality as interbank inflows 
lead to faster loan growth and narrower margins. This may also reflect reduced 
market access in downturn 
• Lending by foreign bank subsidiaries in the domestic market is less procyclical than 
that of domestic banks. An exchange rate fall raises lending by foreign bank but not 
domestic one, which may reflect impact of exchange rate crises on domestic banks 
• State owned banks have narrower margins (and are unprofitable on average), 
provision more (suggesting more asset quality problems) and have slower loan 
growth (could reflect restructuring) 
 
A.   Econometric Specification and Results using a Macro Data Panel  
The model specification was estimated on a panel of nine countries (Australia, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand) for which a 
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sufficiently long quarterly time series are available (1960:1-2004:3). It uses aggregate real 
bank credit growth as the dependent variable and the following explanatory variables: 5 
• Real GDP growth, to capture the demand side effects on credit growth associated 
with pro-cyclicality. 
• Real property prices, to capture the key role of collateral in lending growth, and the 
change in the growth rate of real housing prices to capture the non-linear effect of 
large changes in property prices on the value of collateral. 
• The real interest rate to control for monetary policy shocks (which, a priori, can have 
a negative or positive sign where the latter occurs if demand shocks are prevalent).  
• An error correction term (ECT) to capture adjustments back to the long-run 
equilibrium, and the ECT squared to allow for possible non-linear effects where this 
adjustment is more rapid for large deviations (a long-run co-integration relationship 
between credit and the main explanatory variables was found for six countries, so the 
model with the ECT was estimated using only the sub-sample of these countries).  
• Lags of the above variables, and country-specific fixed effects, which are reported in 
the Appendix. 
In the specification for the full set of countries (column 1, Table 8), the explanatory variables 
have the expected signs. The low coefficient on GDP growth points to a weak procyclical 
effect (although results below show a much stronger effect). An increase in housing prices 
raises credit growth but also has a significant positive non-linear effect on credit growth. This 
providing support for the view that rapid growth in housing prices can lead to credit booms, 
which can be quickly reversed when the property price bubble busts causing a sharp fall in 
credit. 
The specification for the sub-sample of countries for which there is a long-run co-integration 
was found between credit and its determinants (column 2). The estimates indicate that all 
                                                 
5
 Appendix I provides the detailed estimation results and a description of the data. To obtain 
robust and reliable time series estimation results, only variables with a long enough time 
series at a quarterly frequency were used. This meant that specific supply-side factors such as 
banking system capital or profitability could not be included. This is one reason for 
undertaking the panel estimation using individual bank-level data (see next section), where 
the very large cross section dimension provided by data for 300 banks compensated for the 
short time series and low (annual) frequency of such supply side variables. The only banking 
sector variable that met these time series data requirements was the value of the banking-
sector stock index relative to the overall stock-market but, like the overall equity market 
index, was not significant. 
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variables have the same qualitative effect with no major quantitative changes in the size of 
the coefficients—with the exception of housing prices whose effect almost doubled.  
When the ECT is added to the latter specification (column 3) it has the expected negative 
sign—giving evidence of mean reversion—but it is not statistically significant. The ECT 
squared, however, is highly significant with the expected sign, indicating a non-linear mean 
reversion effect: large deviations of credit from its fundamentals would tend to revert 
relatively fast to equilibrium. This could reflect a special feature of procyclicality, with large 
deviations being corrected much more rapidly, and is consistent with financial instability 
playing a role in pro-cyclicality because large corrections would tend to occur during such 
episodes. 
B.   Econometric Specification and Results using a Panel of Bank-Level Data  
Bank level data allow identification of supply side effects that correspond to factors 
exacerbating pro-cyclicality and must be combined with macro data that capture demand 
effects.6 The specification below is estimated using a panel of 300 Asian banks and macro 
variables for 11 countries over 1996-2003. Three dependent variables are used (“Y” in 
equation 1): real loan growth, the loan pricing margin and the provisioning rate. Real loan 
growth (deflated by CPI) measures the expansion of individual banks’ loan portfolios which, 
when aggregated, corresponds to the real credit growth that is the link to pro-cyclicality 
(although the 300 banks are only a subset of the total). The lending margin (interest 
receipts/assets less the money market rate) measures the pricing of credit risk and thus helps 
identify the factors that could contribute to the under pricing of risk. Provisions/assets show 
the extent to which bank provisioning is pro-cyclical. Following Davis and Zhu (2004b), 
there are four sets of explanatory variables: 
Yi,t=f(macro variables, bank-level variablesi,t-1, dummy variablesi, othert) + ei,t  (1) 
1. Macroeconomic variables that reflect the state of the economy—GDP growth, 
inflation and short term nominal interest rates. 
2. Bank-level variables (lagged one period to avoid simultaneity problems): the 
loan/asset ratio as a proxy for credit risk (as other assets such as securities are less 
risky); short term funding/assets, as a proxy for liquidity risk (e.g. greater 
vulnerability to bank runs); the capital ratio, measuring banks’ capacity to absorb 
losses (the equity/assets is used since there are more observations but results with the 
Basel capital adequacy ratio are similar); and EBDTA/assets in the provisioning 
equation as an indicator of underlying profitability. Lending growth and interest 
margins are also added as independent variables in all equations except their own. 
                                                 
6
 In effect, the cross-section variation of the bank level data in the panel can be used to solve 
the identification problem that arises in pure time series estimation. 
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3. Country dummies to capture idiosyncratic country effects, such as differences in 
financial structure, financial development and law/regulation variables. 
4. Additional aggregate variables added sequentially to capture specific effects that 
could generate pro-cyclicality: the property sector relative equity price (the property 
sub sector equity index relative to the market index), the change in the U.S. Dollars 
exchange rate, the change in real interbank liabilities (in U.S. Dollars), years since 
the last “bust” (defined as when provisions were increased in two successive years), 
a Japan dummy, and dummies for domestically owned banks and state owned banks. 
Estimates of equations for real loan growth, asset margins and provisioning rates are shown 
in Table 9 with detailed results in Appendix Tables 6, 7 and 8. Equations were also run to test 
for differences between emerging market and industrial countries (Table 10) and between 
domestic and foreign banks (Table 11). Further work looked at different property price 
proxies (Table 12), whether domestic and foreign banks react differentially to property prices 
(Table 13) and for distinctive effects of public banks (Table 14). Also, as a robustness check 
the equations were run excluding Japan (Appendix Table 9) but the results were mostly 
unchanged despite Japanese banks being around half the sample (Appendix Table 4). Bank 
level data are for commercial banks from the Bankscope database7 and details of the data 
coverage are in Appendix Table 5. 
The estimation results for different specifications of the model make it possible to assess the 
importance of many of the factor identified above in terms of their potential to exacerbate 
pro-cyclicality.  
Testing for the pro-cyclicality of bank lending growth  
Estimation results confirm the influence of the standard demand side variables on the pro-
cyclicality of lending at the level of the individual bank (Table 9 and Appendix Table 6). 
Real GDP growth, inflation and nominal short term interest rate are significant in explaining 
real loan growth and, with the exception of inflation, this remains the case when additional 
micro and financial variables are included. In all cases, loan growth is pro-cyclical due to the 
positive sign on GDP growth. The coefficient on GDP growth is close to 1, suggesting that 
the pattern of credit is in line with the cycle on average rather than having a much greater 
amplitude. The positive sign on interest rates suggests that the authorities increase interest 
                                                 
7
 Filtering of the data was used to eliminate extreme observations that could reflect 
misreporting. Any bank that failed the following tests in at least one year removed from the 
dataset: the return on bank assets in absolute terms less than 10 percent; a growth rate of 
nominal bank assets smaller than 100 percent in absolute terms; a growth rate of nominal 
bank loans smaller than 100 percent in absolute terms;  a ratio of bank loans to bank assets 
larger than 10 percent and smaller than 90 percent; a ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans smaller than 100 percent. 
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rates as credit growth accelerates, which suggests monetary policy is not adding to pro-
cyclicality. The capital adequacy ratio is significant and positive (equations  
3-8, Appendix Table 6), suggesting stronger banks increase lending more rapidly.  
Testing for excessive reliance on collateral  
The importance of collateral values to credit growth is confirmed by the significance of 
property prices in the specification using macro data (Table 8) and the correlations reported 
in Section II, since property is a primary form of collateral. Various asset prices were used in 
the estimation with bank-level data. The most successful was the property sector equity 
market sub-index relative to overall market index, which is consistently significant and 
positive (Table 9 and Appendix Table 6). Rising property share price also reduce lending 
margins, suggesting that rising collateral values lead to perceptions of lower risk, and 
consistent with this, also reduce provisioning (Table 9).  
The property sector equity index variable is consistently significant across equations in a way 
that is not true for the change in real house prices or in real share prices (Table 12) as these 
variables become insignificant when the change in the exchange rate is added. This apparent 
inconsistency between the high significance of property prices in with macro data estimation 
can be explained by several factors: (i) the short sample period dominated by the Asian crisis 
in which property prices and the exchange rate were very highly correlated. The resulting 
multi-colinearity may cause property prices not to be significant in specifications when the 
exchange rate is included; (ii) different and offsetting responses of domestic and foreign bank 
credit to property prices, where property prices are highly significant for foreign and 
domestic banks separately but with opposite signs (Table 13); and, (iii) residential housing 
market loans are less important on average for the banks than lending for commercial 
property, where commercial property prices (which were not available) are better proxied by 
the property company share index than housing prices at the individual bank level.  
Testing for deterioration in the quality of credit assessment during cyclical upswings 
This test follows the approach of Berger and Udell (2003) of adding a variable representing 
the number of years since peak provisioning relative to loans. The estimation results are 
consistent with a deterioration of lending practices during cyclical expansions. As shown in 
Table 9, as the time since the last “bust” increases loan growth accelerates, and lending 
margins decline, which together are consistent with increased risk taking. Furthermore, the 
variable is negatively related to provisioning, although this correlation may be partly due to 
the variable being itself defined relative to peak provisions.  
Testing for the compression of lending margins during cyclical upswings  
This involved testing for effects of GDP growth and credit growth on interest margins. 
Estimation results (Table 9 and Appendix Table 7) show that interest margin is strongly 
counter cyclical in East Asia (i.e. it narrows in cyclical upswings). This contrasts with the 
positive estimates for global banks in Davis and Zhu (2004b). Margins also fall when loan 
growth is rapid, consistent with a build up of credit risk. There is also a significant negative 
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sign on different property price variables (Tables 9 and 12), suggesting that rising collateral 
values lead to a narrowing of margins. There is also a positive effect of inflation and a 
negative one from the money market rate, which may again indicate pro-cyclicality.  
Testing for delayed recognition and provisioning for NPLs and regulatory forbearance  
This can be tested using estimates of the impact of GDP growth, credit growth and earnings 
on the provisioning rate (Table 9 and Appendix Table 8). The sign on real GDP growth and 
on asset prices is consistently negative, suggesting that banks do not provision in good times 
for later losses but only when the downturn occurs. Also there is a negative sign on loan 
growth, suggesting that provisions are not responsive to risk (which typically rises when loan 
growth increases owing partly to adverse selection). There is a negative relation between 
earnings (EBDTA/assets) and provisioning indicating that banks tend to increase provisions 
when earnings are declining or negative rather than when they are doing well. This result is 
contrary to global results from Davis and Zhu (2004b) and Laeven and Majnoni (2002) for 
developed countries. The result also exists when we exclude Japan (Appendix Table 9). 
Overall, the results suggest that delays in provisioning may be a feature of Asian banking 
systems.  
Moreover, lagged provisioning rates in the lending equation have a consistently negative 
sign, suggesting that the taking of provisions reduces banks’ willingness to lend (Table 9 and 
Appendix Table 6). A one percentage point rise in the provision rate reduces loan growth by 
around 0.75 percentage points. This confirms that delayed provisioning can exacerbate pro-
cyclicality. 
Testing whether losses lead banks to restructure balance sheets by reducing loans 
An impact of the capital adequacy ratio on lending and margins might suggest that banks 
restructure balance sheets to reduce risk weighted assets so as to maintain their CARs in 
times of stress. For Asian banks, the capital ratio has a positive effect on lending (Table 9) 
consistent with prudence (robust banks lend more), although this result appears to apply most 
strongly to advanced country banks (Table 10). For asset margins, no effect was detectable in 
the full sample, but Table 10 shows that there is an important distinction between banks in 
advanced countries and in emerging markets. The former have a positive effect of capital 
adequacy on margins (robust banks take higher risks but also charge higher margins) but for 
emerging market country banks, capital has a negative effect on margins suggesting 
“gambling for resurrection” i.e., with low-capitalised banks having also riskier lending.  
Testing for bank dependence on offshore foreign sources of funds 
To test for bank dependence on offshore foreign sources of funds and a corresponding impact 
on procyclicality, the percentage change in real interbank loans to each country (in dollars) 
by all BIS reporting banks and the exchange rate are added. The former in particular reveals 
the extent to which inflows and outflows from the international interbank market may drive 
domestic financing conditions. The results in Table 9 show that a rise in foreign interbank 
loans raises domestic lending growth and narrows margins, and it also coincides with lower 
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provisioning. These imply a pro-cyclical effect arising from external flows, as the liquidity 
they provide to banks eases constraints on lending, to the extent that interbank loans are also 
procyclical. 
An exchange rate depreciation reduces lending, notably when allowance is made for different 
behaviour by Japanese banks (dummy for Japan times exchange rate). Note that this is 
contrary to “textbook” behavior which would suggest a depreciation raises lending and 
reduces risk as competitiveness of domestic firms increases, as say in the UK following the 
1992 ERM crisis. It suggests depreciation is often linked to currency crises which entail a 
cutting off of capital flows. Also, as noted by Gertler et al (2003), the Asian crisis countries 
devalued together in 1997-8 so the competitiveness gain from devaluation was lessened. 
There is a difference between advanced country and emerging market banks, where for the 
former there is a positive link of bank lending to exchange rate depreciation, while for the 
latter, as for the whole sample, lending falls when there is depreciation, consistent with the 
currency-crisis explanation (Table 10). Meanwhile, depreciation raises margins and has little 
effect on provisioning, except for Japanese banks. 
Testing for the effect of foreign banks  
To assess the role of foreign bank subsidiaries on pro-cyclicality within a country, two 
empirical tests were used. First, a dummy variable for domestic banks was added to the 
lending, interest margins and provisioning equations to differentiate behavior of domestic 
and foreign banks with respect to these dependent variables. Second, each of the coefficients 
were leveraged in each equation by the same dummy variable.  
Addition of the single-dummy in Table 9 shows that foreign ownership entails lower lending 
growth overall, and wider margins. This is consistent with greater prudence by foreign banks 
in respect of credit risk. Table 10 suggests that there are significant differences between 
domestic and foreign banks in the emerging market economies but less so in the advanced 
countries (the ownership dummy is more often significant for emerging market economies). 
In sum, the behavior of domestic banks in the emerging market economies differs from both 
foreign banks in the countries and domestic banks in advanced Asian economies. 
Table 11 reports results distinguishing between foreign and domestic bank behavior for each 
determinant of lending, provisioning and margins separately, by leveraging each coefficient 
by a domestic bank dummy. In the table, the foreign bank effect is shown in the column 
“variable” while the domestic bank effect is “variable” plus “leveraged”. For loan growth, 
domestic banks are more procyclical in terms of the relationship of lending to GDP than 
foreign banks and their lending growth responds more to the interest margin. Other effects 
are similar for both groups (i.e., the leveraged coefficients are insignificant). When the 
property sector equity index is replaced with house prices, there is greater sensitivity of 
foreign than domestic banks to rising house prices, as discussed above (Table 13). 
For the asset margin, the positive effect of the loan/asset ratio on margins is weaker for 
domestic banks than foreign banks, implying that they are more willing to shift portfolio 
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composition without raising lending costs. This is plausible, since the foreign bank 
subsidiaries shown in Bankscope are only part of the parent bank’s world wide balance sheet. 
Also, for domestic banks, as noted above, there is a negative effect of the capital ratio on the 
interest margin. Their interest margins respond negatively to property prices, while foreign 
banks do not. The negative effect of international interbank flows on margins is greater for 
domestic banks. All of these suggest it is domestic banks that are more procyclical in their 
behaviour than foreign banks, although an offset is that the estimated “memory loss” in terms 
of margins appears to be less for domestic than foreign banks.  
Provisioning appears to be less cyclical in terms of GDP for domestic than foreign banks, but 
it is more procyclical relative to the property price. This may reflect differences in balance 
sheets, whereby domestic bank lending is more collateral-based than foreign banks. It is 
domestic and not foreign banks that are failing to income-smooth by raising provisions when 
income is strong (indeed, there is a strong negative effect of EBDTA on provisions for 
domestic banks). Finally, domestic banks’ provisioning responds strongly to interbank flows, 
while foreign banks’ does not. 
Testing for the effect of state-owned banks 
State owned bank behavior was significantly different from other banks. Estimation results 
show that they have higher provisioning rates, implying their lending is riskier with a higher 
default rate (Table 14). Moreover, they have lower margins implying that they margin is 
unlikely to be adequate to cover the credit risk. This is consistent with the result that state 
banks make losses on average in emerging markets (Mian, 2003). On the other hand they 
also have slower loan growth. This could reflect credit rationing but may also be because 
public banks include some distressed banks under resolution or restructuring. 
 
Financial liberalization 
To detect some of the effects of financial liberalization, the correlations between GDP, credit 
and house prices in periods of above and below trend growth were re-estimated for the period 
since 1990 (Appendix, Tables 2-3). The Credit-GDP correlations are similar, as are those 
between GDP and house prices in the downturn. However, there seems to be a greater 
correlation since financial liberalization between house prices and GDP. On the other hand 
the credit-house price correlation is rather less, consistent with a release of credit rationing 
constraints with financial liberalization (credit availability does not constrain changes in asset 
prices). 
VII.   CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
This paper has shown how specific features of financial systems may be exacerbating pro-
cyclicality in Asia. The association of pro-cyclicality with financial and macroeconomic 
instability in emerging markets highlights the need for policies that address these sources of 
procyclicality. While these policies are largely prudential and are intended to strengthen 
structural and institutional aspects of financial systems, they can also provide substantial 
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additional benefits by limiting pro-cyclicality. Other potential benefits are enhanced 
credibility of monetary and exchange rate policies where, for example, the lower risk of 
financial and macroeconomic instability could contribute to the sustainability of exchange 
rate regimes.  
Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis point to specific policies where these benefits 
could be substantial: 
• Measures to avoid excessive reliance on collateral to limit the extent to which large 
movements in property prices exacerbate pro-cyclicality that ensure that bank loan 
evaluation is based on borrowers’ capacity to repay using forward-looking criteria. 
• Prompt recognition of impaired assets through implementation of a rigorous loan 
classification system to avoid the build-up of unrecognized credit risk during periods 
of expansion that materializes in a cyclical downturn. 
• Measures to lessen the extent to which provisioning is pro-cyclical by, for example, 
putting in place an ex-ante general provision system to ensure early provisioning 
against expected loss, rather than waiting for losses to occur in a cyclical downturn. 
• Measures to limit the under-pricing of credit risk in cyclical expansions that 
encourage banks to assess credit risk in a more forward-looking way over a longer 
horizon, or, if this proves difficult, that involve adjusting regulatory capital ratios 
counter-cyclically to increase capital held against new loans in the expansion. 
Implementation may need to take into account the need to limit pro-cyclicality. This could 
involve using prudential policies in a more pro-active manner aimed at offsetting the pro-
cyclical effects of financial system developments. The purpose would be to reduce the risks 
of financial instability associated with pro-cyclicality. Thus, prudential policies would 
contribute to macroeconomic stability but would not be substituting for macroeconomic 
policies. It could involve prudential policy responding to aggregate macro-prudential risks 
(such as accelerating credit growth or rapidly rising property prices) to a greater extent than 
is now the case. A number of Asian countries have put in place such policies largely to 
address identified weaknesses in their financial system and could consider using them in a 
more pro-active manner to limit procyclicality.  
 
There are two examples of more pro-active prudential policies that are currently receiving a 
lot of attention: the adjustment of regulatory capital ratios (CARs) in a counter-cyclical way; 
and, dynamic provisioning, which essentially involves extending ex-ante general provisions 
to cover risks associated with the economic cycle in addition to the microeconomic risks in 
specific sectors. Preparations for Basel II have also highlighted the role of more pro-active 
prudential policies. Specifically, Pillar 1 of Basel II has been shown to be inherently pro-
cyclical, which has led to proposals for “Pillar 2” policies that make regulatory capital ratios 
counter-cyclical to offset this effect.  
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A fruitful comparison can be made between these types of pro-active policy and the 
traditional approach of supervisory forbearance. It is clear that forbearance can dampen 
procyclicality in the short term; authorities have incentives to limit the fall in credit in the 
downturn and a policy of forbearance does this. This is typically assumed to be temporary 
and reversible when economic recovery improves asset quality. But there are risks from 
forbearance; the true capital ratio (not the reported ratio) is likely to fall to low levels as 
losses mount, banks make riskier loans (given the incentive to “gamble for resurrection” with 
low capital ) and so asset quality and capital ratio may not recover. A countercyclical CAR 
offer an more-prudent alternative to forbearance as a means to dampen procyclicality; the 
authorities would allow CARs to fall in downturns, giving less pressure to cut lending to 
lower risk weighted assets (to raise CAR), but would require CAR to rise during expansions, 
which dampens credit growth as more capital must be held against new loans. This could 
offset pressures to under price risk. 
 
Thus far, effort to address weaknesses in financial systems has been conceived of as a largely 
static exercise focused on strengthening financial institutions at the micro level. This has, and 
should continue to, yield substantial benefits in terms of macroeconomic and financial 
stability. However, increased attention to pro-cyclicality has highlighted the potential 
additional benefits from more dynamic pro-active prudential policies. Their purpose would 
be to limit the extent to which existing fundamental weaknesses in the financial sector 
contribute to risks at the aggregate level by, for example, contributing to rapid credit growth 
or asset price inflation. This would protect the financial sector by lessening the risk that 
increased macroeconomic volatility could reverberate back to harm the sector. 
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Table 1. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP 
 Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.26 0.34 
China 0.31 -0.15 
Hong Kong SAR 0.39 0.44 
Indonesia 0.82 0.32 
Japan 0.48 0.65 
Korea 0.09 0.35 
Malaysia 0.51 0.49 
New Zealand 0.27 0.03 
Philippines 0.33 0.43 
Singapore 0.69 0.35 
Thailand 0.32 0.35 
Average 0.41 0.33 
     Memo item:   
Average for G-7 & 7 EU cos. 0.31 0.41 
 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP––Cyclical 
Asymmetries 
Boom  
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.05 0.04 
China -0.05 -0.34 
Hong Kong SAR 0.38 0.08 
Indonesia 0.13 0.37 
Japan 0.09 0.23 
Korea 0.33 0.30 
Malaysia 0.04 0.15 
New Zealand 0.63 0.30 
Philippines 0.14 0.16 
Singapore 0.21 0.01 
Thailand 0.33 0.56 
Average 0.21 0.17 
Recession  
(Growth Below Average) 
  
Australia 0.23 0.38 
China 0.13 -0.02 
Hong Kong SAR 0.26 0.54 
Indonesia 0.89 0.24 
Japan 0.47 0.51 
Korea -0.02 0.42 
Malaysia 0.52 0.35 
New Zealand 0.13 0.26 
Philippines 0.53 0.70 
Singapore 0.77 0.26 
Thailand 0.31 -0.30 
Average 0.38 0.30 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real House Prices 
 Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.38 0.50 
China   
Hong Kong SAR -0.01 0.66 
Indonesia 0.82 0.16 
Japan 0.50 0.85 
Korea 0.01 0.35 
Malaysia 0.28 0.71 
New Zealand 0.18 0.10 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.60 0.42 
Thailand -0.04 -0.23 
Average 0.30 0.39 
     Memo item:   
Average for G-7 & 7 EU cos. 0.34 0.44 
 
Table 4. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP 
 
 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices 
Australia 0.10 0.42 
China   
Hong Kong SAR 0.02 0.64 
Indonesia 0.01 0.91 
Japan 0.25 0.61 
Korea -0.02 0.43 
Malaysia -0.36 0.81 
New Zealand 0.06 0.37 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.18 0.61 
Thailand -0.13 0.48 
Average 0.01 0.59 
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Table 5. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real House Prices—
Cyclical Asymmetries 
 
Boom  
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.02 0.33 
China   
Hong Kong SAR 0.57 0.82 
Indonesia 0.03 -0.1 
Japan 0.22 0.63 
Korea 0.04 -0.21 
Malaysia   
New Zealand 0.24 0.02 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.004 0.18 
Thailand -0.46 -0.29 
Average 0.08 0.17 
Recession  
(Growth Below Average) 
  
Australia 0.29 0.42 
China   
Hong Kong SAR -0.18 0.41 
Indonesia 0.57 0.05 
Japan 0.45 0.65 
Korea -0.24 0.55 
Malaysia 0.08 0.72 
New Zealand -0.11 0.02 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.43 0.04 
Thailand -0.2 0.26 
Average 0.12 0.35 
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Table 6. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP—Cyclical 
Asymmetries 
 
Boom  
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices 
Australia 0.06 -0.004 
China   
Hong Kong SAR -0.39 -0.59 
Indonesia 0.15 -0.37 
Japan -0.04 0.47 
Korea 0.32 0.28 
Malaysia   
New Zealand -0.14 -0.03 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.18 0.28 
Thailand -0.20 -0.30 
Average -0.01 -0.03 
Recession  
(Growth Below Average)   
Australia -0.04 0.51 
China   
Hong Kong SAR 0.07 0.78 
Indonesia -0.11 0.95 
Japan 0.34 0.42 
Korea -0.12 0.54 
Malaysia -0.06 0.81 
New Zealand 0.06 0.17 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.06 0.65 
Thailand -0.08 0.63 
Average 0.01 0.61 
 
Table 7. Exposure of International (BIS) Banks to Asian Countries 
(end-December 2003, in percent) 
 
 
BIS banks’ exposure/ 
domestic credit 
BIS banks exposure in 
FX to local banks/ 
domestic credit 
Local currency liabilities 
of BIS Banks/ total 
deposit liabilities 
China 2.5 1.0 0.3 
Hong Kong SAR 116.4 18.4 49.4 
Indonesia 29.4 2.1 6.1 
Japan 10.1 3.5 2.2 
Malaysia 49.1 3.0 30.4 
New Zealand 106.2 12.2 85.9 
Philippines 57.5 14.8 13.1 
Singapore 171.6 71.6 48.3 
Thailand 27.2 2.7 14.0 
 
Sources: BIS and IFS (to be updated)
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Table 8. Determinants of Credit Growth, Panel Estimation 
 
  Sub-sample 
  All sample Without ECT With ECT 
 
GDP growth 0.1022 0.0760 0.0752 
 0.0036 0.0126 0.0187 
Change in real housing 
prices 0.0285 0.0516 0.0414 
 0.0025 0.0000 0.0007 
Acceleration in real housing 
prices 0.0199 0.0850 0.0668 
 0.0729 0.0004 0.0117 
 
Real interest rate 0.4227 0.4244 0.4044 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Real interest rate lagged -0.2301 -0.3381 -0.2841 
 0.0122 0.0000 0.0004 
 
ECT(t-1)   -0.0064 
   0.3680 
 
ECT(t-1)^2   -0.0246 
   0.0477 
 
R-squared 0.8317 0.8970 0.8978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8227 0.8943 0.8946 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.2005 1.8581 1.8540 
 
Note: The figures under the coefficient estimates are p-values; a p-value 
below 0.05 indicates significance at a 95 percent confidence level. The 
panel also includes lagged values of the right-hand-side variable as well as 
country-specific fixed-effects. 
 
Source: Staff own estimates. The panel includes Australia, HK, Japan, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand. 
The sub-sample corresponding to the last two columns includes Australia, 
HK, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore (those countries for which (i) an 
adequate time-series length was available and (ii) evidence of co-
integration was found). It covers the period 1960:1 to 2004:2, however 
only in a few countries, including Australia, Japan and New Zealand, a 
complete time series was available. 
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 Table 9. Equations for Bank Loan Growth, the Lending Margin and Provisioning Rate 
 
 Loan Growth  Lending Margin  Provisioning 
Independent variables      
Constant -13.0 
(1.8) 
 2.3** 
(5.2) 
 1.8** 
(3.5) 
Macro indicators      
GDP growth 0.74** 
(4.4) 
 -0.014 
(1.4) 
 -0.03** 
(2.3) 
Inflation -0.06 
(0.2) 
 0.13** 
(6.9) 
 0.05* 
(1.7) 
Interest rate 1.2** 
(5.3) 
 -0.49** 
(24.6) 
 0.033 
(1.2) 
Bank indicators      
Loan/Asset  
(-1) 
-0.12** 
(2.2) 
 0.025** 
(7.7) 
 0.02**  
(3.8) 
Loan growth  
(-1) 
  -0.004** 
(2.3) 
 -0.008** 
(4.1) 
Asset margin 
(-1) 
0.14 
(0.4) 
   -0.05 
(1.5) 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
0.45** 
(2.7) 
 -0.014 
(1.2) 
 -0.005 
(0.4) 
St funding/ Assets 
(-1) 
0.07 
(1.2) 
 0.001 
(0.3) 
 -0.006 
(1.4) 
EBDTA (-1)     -0.15** 
(3.4) 
Additional variables 0.05* 
(1.7) 
 -0.004** 
(2.1) 
  
Property share relative -0.11* 
(1.7) 
 0.009** 
(2.6) 
 -0.004* 
(1.7) 
Change in USD rate 0.17* 
(1.6) 
 -0.003 
(0.4) 
 -0.001 
(0.0) 
Japan dummy*DUSD 0.06** 
(3.5) 
 -0.006** 
(5.6) 
 0.02** 
(2.3) 
Change in real interbank 
flows (USD) 
1.05** 
(4.3) 
 -0.091** 
(5.9) 
 -0.002* 
(1.8) 
Years since last “bust” 6.3** 
(2.9) 
 -0.31** 
(2.5) 
 -0.18** 
(9.0) 
Domestic Ownership     0.001 
(0.1) 
Public banks dummy -10.3 
(3.6) 
 -0.35 
(2.1) 
 0.44 
(2.2) 
Obs 1029  839  807 
R2 0.27  0.76  0.28 
      
 
Note: all equations include country dummies––not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 
percent and 95 percent respectively. 
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Table 10. Equations for Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Loan 
Growth 
Advanced 
Loan 
growth 
EMEs 
Asset Margin 
Advanced 
Asset 
Margin 
EMEs 
Provisioning 
Advanced 
Provisioning 
EME 
Constant -19.4** 
(3.3) 
13.4 
(0.7) 
0.67 
(1.4) 
4.6** 
(5.1) 
1.4** 
(3.3) 
0.67 
(0.4) 
Macro indicators       
GDP growth 0.73** 
(4.5) 
0.4 
(0.9) 
-0.05** 
(4.5) 
0.04** 
(2.0) 
-0.013 
(1.5) 
-0.04 
(1.2) 
Inflation 0.25  
(1.1) 
-0.6 
(0.7) 
0.14** 
(6.2) 
0.18** 
(4.2) 
0.024 
(1.4) 
0.11 
(1.3) 
Interest rate 0.36 
(0.9) 
3.0** 
(3.4) 
-0.35** 
(14.1) 
-0.59** 
(14.5) 
0.011 
(0.6) 
0.05 
(0.6) 
Bank indicators       
Loan/Asset (-1) 0.01 
(0.2) 
-0.3** 
(2.4) 
0.03** 
(7.6) 
0.011** 
(1.9) 
0.008** 
(2.3) 
0.02** 
(2.0) 
Loan growth  
(-1) 
  -0.0002 
(0.1) 
-0.003 
(1.4) 
-0.006** 
(3.3) 
-0.007* 
(1.8) 
Asset margin  
(-1) 
-1.1** 
(2.2) 
0.9 
(1.3) 
  0.08** 
(2.9) 
-0.04 
(0.6) 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
0.87** 
(4.3) 
0.17 
(0.6) 
0.043** 
(2.7) 
-0.074** 
(4.0) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
0.01 
(0.3) 
St funding/ 
Assets (-1) 
0.15** 
(3.5) 
-0.15 
(1.0) 
-0.001 
(0.1) 
-0.01 
(1.4) 
-0.013** 
(4.5) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
EBDTA 
(-1) 
    0.013 
(0.3) 
-0.26** 
(3.0) 
Additional 
variables 
      
Property share 
relative 
0.07** 
(2.0) 
-0.009 
(0.1) 
-0.001 
(0.6) 
-0.003 
(0.9) 
0.0005 
(0.3) 
-0.005 
(1.0) 
Change in USD 
rate 
0.19** 
(2.7) 
-0.48** 
(3.3) 
0.013** 
(3.0) 
0.028** 
(4.0) 
-0.003 
(0.9) 
-0.014 
(1.3) 
Japan 
dummy*DUSD 
-0.16 
(1.5) 
 -0.015** 
(2.2) 
 0.015** 
(2.7) 
 
Change real 
interbank (USD) 
0.07** 
(3.5) 
0.03 
(0.9) 
-0.0016 
(1.2) 
-0.011** 
(5.9) 
-0.0007 
(0.7) 
-0.004 
(1.1) 
Years since last 
“bust” 
1.0** 
(4.6) 
0.8 
(1.4) 
-0.054** 
(3.2) 
-0.11** 
(3.9) 
-0.13** 
(10.0) 
-0.3** 
(5.0) 
Domestic 
ownership 
-1.8 
(1.0) 
12.0** 
(2.6) 
-0.03 
(0.2) 
-0.76** 
(3.2) 
-0.12 
(1.0) 
0.04 
(0.1) 
Obs 715 336 577 285 561 271 
R2 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.81 0.36 0.21 
 
Advanced countries are defined as Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore, while 
emerging market economies are defined as China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
Note: all equations include country dummies—not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 percent 
and 95 percent respectively. 
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Table 11. Equations Differentiating Foreign and Domestic Effects 
 
 Loan Growth  Asset Margin  Provision rate 
Independent 
variables 
Variable Leveraged by 
domestic 
dummy 
 Variable Leveraged 
by domestic 
dummy 
 Variable Leveraged by 
domestic 
dummy 
Constant -14.6** 
(2.0) 
  2.1** 
(4.9) 
  2.0** 
(3.9) 
 
Macro 
indicators 
        
GDP growth 0.38 
(1.4) 
0.63** 
(1.9) 
 -0.03** 
(2.2) 
0.03 
(1.5) 
 -0.07** 
(3.8) 
0.07** 
(2.8) 
Inflation -0.22 
(0.6) 
0.32 
(0.6) 
 0.17** 
(6.2) 
-0.07** 
(2.1) 
 0.04 
(1.2) 
0.003 
(0.1) 
Interest rate 1.22** 
(2.3) 
-0.12 
(0.2) 
 -0.52** 
(18.2) 
0.03 
(0.8) 
 0.07* 
(1.7) 
-0.07 
(1.3) 
Bank 
indicators 
        
Loan/Asset (-
1) 
-0.13* 
(1.6) 
0.05 
(0.5) 
 0.033** 
(7.3) 
-0.014** 
(2.4) 
 0.02** 
(3.5) 
-0.01 
(1.4) 
Loan growth  
(-1) 
   -0.0044* 
(1.9) 
0.001 
(0.4) 
 -0.012** 
(3.8) 
0.005 
(1.2) 
Asset margin 
(-1) 
-0.66 
(1.1) 
1.4* 
(1.8) 
    0.01 
(0.2) 
-0.08 
(1.4) 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
0.32* 
(1.7) 
0.4 
(1.4) 
 0.009 
(0.6) 
-0.066** 
(3.3) 
 -0.009 
(0.5) 
-0.004 
(0.1) 
St funding/ 
Assets (-1) 
0.11 
(1.3) 
-0.03 
(0.4) 
 -0.003 
(0.7) 
0.008* 
(1.7) 
 -0.015** 
(2.3) 
0.01* 
(1.9) 
EBDTA  
(-1) 
      -0.05 
(0.8) 
-0.2** 
(2.4) 
Additional 
variables 
        
Property share 
relative 
0.03 
(0.5) 
0.03 
(0.4) 
 0.003 
(0.8) 
-0.01** 
(2.4) 
 0.01** 
(2.2) 
-0.02** 
(4.0) 
Change in 
USD rate 
-0.05 
(0.5) 
-0.12 
(0.9) 
 0.008 
(1.4) 
0.005 
(0.6) 
 -0.001 
(0.2) 
0.0008 
(0.1) 
Japan 
dummy*DUS
D 
0.22* 
(1.8) 
  0.002 
(0.3) 
  0.04** 
(3.9) 
 
Change in real 
interbank 
flows (USD) 
0.08** 
(2.8) 
-0.019 
(0.5) 
 -0.004** 
(2.4) 
-0.005** 
(2.2) 
 -0.0004 
(0.2) 
-0.005* 
(1.9) 
Years since 
last “bust” 
1.6** 
(3.2) 
-0.88 
(.1.5) 
 -0.14** 
(4.4) 
0.06* 
(1.8) 
 -0.23** 
(5.7) 
0.07 
(1.4) 
Obs 991  803  795 
R2 0.27  0.78  0.28 
 
Note: all equations include country dummies––not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 
percent and 95 percent respectively. 
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Table 12. Varying Property Price Proxies 
 
Different asset price variables 
added to existing equations 
Loan growth 
(Table 9) 
Asset margin 
(Table 10) 
Provisioning 
(Table 11) 
Equation (8) full sample    
Change in property share index 
relative to broad equity index 
0.05* 
(1.7) 
-0.004** 
(2.1) 
-0.004* 
(1.7) 
Change in real house prices -0.02 
(0.4) 
-0.007 
(1.3) 
-0.01 
(0.9) 
Change in real share prices -0.09** 
(3.6) 
0.009** 
(3.9) 
0.0004 
(0.1) 
Equation (3) full sample    
Change in property share index 
relative to broad equity index 
0.07** 
(3.3) 
-0.002 
(1.5) 
0.001 
(0.5) 
Change in real house prices 0.08 
(1.6) 
-0.025** 
(4.7) 
0.002 
(0.1) 
Change in real share prices -0.12** 
(5.4) 
0.013** 
(6.1) 
-0.002 
(0.4) 
Equation (8) full sample 
without exchange rate  
   
Change in property share index 
relative to broad equity index 
0.066** 
(3.2) 
-0.002* 
(1.7) 
0.0001 
(0.1) 
Change in real house prices 0.05 
(0.9) 
-0.016** 
(2.9) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
Change in real share prices -0.097** 
(4.6) 
0.011** 
(5.2) 
-0.005 
(0.9) 
Equation (8) full sample 
without exchange rate 
variables and 1997, 1998 
dummies 
   
Change in property share 
relative 
0.059** 
(2.8) 
-0.001 
(0.7) 
0.0005 
(0.3) 
Change in real house prices 0.044 
(0.9) 
-0.012** 
(2.2) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
Change in real share prices -0.083** 
(3.8) 
0.012** 
(5.5) 
-0.002** 
(5.1) 
 
Note: All equations include country dummies––not reported in detail. 
 
 
 - 36 -  
  
Table 13. Equations Differentiating Foreign and Domestic Effects using Residential Property 
Prices 
 
 Loan Growth  
Independent 
variables 
Variable Leveraged by 
domestic 
dummy 
 
Constant 7.4 
(0.66) 
  
Macro 
indicators 
   
GDP growth 0.06 
(0.16) 
0.80** 
(2.0) 
 
Inflation -2.03** 
(7.0) 
1.27** 
(3.4) 
 
Interest rate 1.51** 
(5.4) 
-1.92** 
(5.4) 
 
Bank 
indicators 
   
Loan/Asset (-
1) 
-0.32** 
(3.8) 
0.13 
(1.2) 
 
Asset margin 
(-1) 
0.87** 
(5.6) 
0.27 
(1.1) 
 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
-0.50** 
(2.4) 
0.75** 
(3.0) 
 
St funding/ 
Assets (-1) 
0.28 
(0.31) 
0.07 
(0.5) 
 
Additional 
variables 
   
Rise in real 
residential 
property price 
0.23** 
(3.4) 
-0.23** 
(2.9) 
 
    
Obs 991  
R2 0.40  
 
Note: All equations include country dummies––not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 
percent and 95 percent respectively. 
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Table 14. Estimates for public bank ownership dummy 
 
Independent variables Loan growth 
(Table 9) 
Asset margin 
(Table 10) 
Provisioning 
(Table 11) 
Equation (8) full sample    
Public banks dummy -10.3** 
(3.6) 
-0.35** 
(2.1) 
0.44** 
(2.2) 
Equation (7) full sample    
Public banks dummy -8.5** 
(3.0) 
-0.41** 
(2.5) 
0.43** 
(2.2) 
Equation (3) full sample    
Public banks dummy -7.2** 
(2.7) 
-0.19 
(0.6) 
1.3** 
(2.8) 
 
 - 38 -  
  
 
Figure 1. Credit and Asset Price Deviations from Trend
Source: Staff own estimates. The Credit series correspond to deviations of the seasonally adjusted 
series of private sector credit to GDP ratio from its long-run trend. The Stock Market series 
correspond to deviations of the ratio of stock market to CPI from its long-run trend.
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Figure 1. Credit and Asset Price Deviations from Trend (continued)
Source:  Staff own estimates. The Credit series correspond to deviations of the seasonally adjusted 
series of private sector credit to GDP ratio from its long-run trend. The Stock Market series 
correspond to deviations of the ratio of stock market to CPI from its long-run trend.
Japan: Credit
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
Japan: Stock Market
-50
-25
0
25
50
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
South Korea: Credit
-10
-5
0
5
10
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
South Korea: Stock Market
-75
-50
-25
0
25
50
75
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
Malaysia: Credit
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
Malaysia: Stock Market
-50
-25
0
25
50
M
ar
-
60
M
ar
-
65
M
ar
-
70
M
ar
-
75
M
ar
-
80
M
ar
-
85
M
ar
-
90
M
ar
-
95
M
ar
-
00
 
 - 40 -  
  
Figure 1. Credit and Asset Price Deviations from Trend (concluded)
Source: Staff own estimates. The Credit series correspond to deviations of the seasonally adjusted 
series of private sector credit to GDP ratio from its long-run trend. The Stock Market series 
correspond to deviations of the ratio of stock market to CPI from its long-run trend.
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APPENDIX1: ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL USING MACROECONOMIC DATA 
 
The model specification for real credit growth entails elements of both credit demand and 
supply. On the demand side, the growth of real private sector credit can be explained by the 
growth of real GDP, DLGDP, with an positive effect of economic activity on credit growth 
expected. On the supply side, the growth in real housing prices, DLRHP, is expected to have 
a positive effect on credit, as an increase in the value of collateral fosters granting of private 
sector credit. The acceleration of housing prices, DLRHP(t)-DLRHP(t-1), is added to the 
model specification in order to capture the effect of “rapid” movements in housing prices on 
credit boom-bust episodes. Also on the supply side, the value of the banking-sector stock 
index relative to the overall stock-market (BIN) is added to proxy for possible credit 
constraints related to poor bank performance in terms of profitability. In principle, it would 
have been desirable to include financial soundness indicator variables, but these were not 
available for the countries concerned over a sufficient time period. The effect of the real 
interest rate on credit is a-priori ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in the interest rate 
(i.e., an increase in the price of loans) will tend to decrease the private demand for credit; on 
the other hand, rising interest rates tend to coincide with increasing private sector demand 
which tends to raise the demand for credit. Also financial liberalization, which eases credit 
constraints, typically raises the real interest rate. 
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 (1) 
• DLRCR4(t) = ln[(CR(t)/CPI(t)) / (CR(t-4)/CPI(t-4))] “annual growth of real credit”, 
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, CR is credit to the private sector, CPI is the 
consumer price index, and t denotes quarters. 
• DLGDP4(t) = ln[GDP(t)/GDP(t-4)] “annual growth or real GDP” GDP represents real 
GDP. 
• DLRHP4(t) = ln[(HP(t)/CPI(t)) / ((HP(t-4)/CPI(t-4))] “annual growth of real housing 
prices”, HP denote a housing price index from Datastream. 
• RIN(t) = ln[(1+IN(t))/(1+PI(t))] “real interest rate”, where IN denotes the money market 
interest rate, and PI is the annual (CPI based) inflation rate. 
• BIN(t) = bank stock index relative to the market stock index.8 
• ECT(t) = “error correction term” defined as the linear combination of LRCR4, LGDP4, 
LRHP4, RIN, and BIN, where the weights correspond to the country-specific 
cointegrating vector based on the Johansen approach. 
                                                 
8
 BIN, which proxies supply-side determinants of bank credit, turned out to be insignificant in the panel 
specifications hence it was excluded from the final models. It was however, found marginally significant in the 
estimation of the long-run cointegration relationships, thus it was included in the cointegrating vectors. 
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In addition to the cyclical (or short-run) determinants of real credit, in some specifications an 
error correction term (ECT) is added to capture deviations of real credit from its long-term 
fundamentals, which include output, interest rate, housing prices, and BIN. This specification 
is similar to a vector error correction model which includes short-term determinants of credit 
growth and long-term determinants—the latter captured by the ECT. The ECT is constructed 
based on a country-by-country estimation of a cointegration relationship by applying the 
Johansen method to the levels of real credit, interest rate, housing prices, and BIN. The 
parameter ρ measures the degree of mean reversion of credit to its long-run equilibrium, 
hence a negative relationship is expected between the ECT and credit growth.9 
As noted above, macro data shows that asset prices lead credit and are positively correlated 
with it (Table 6). On the other hand, asset prices and GDP are broadly contemporaneously—
and positively—correlated (Table 7). Splitting between periods with above and below 
average GDP growth (Table 10 and 11) we find that between house prices and real GDP 
there is virtually no correlation in the boom period but a very strong one in the downturn, 
whereby real house prices lead or change contemporaneously with real GDP. As regards the 
link of house prices to credit, there is a link both in the boom and recession, albeit stronger in 
the latter, with credit lagging house prices. These results are consistent with pro-cyclicality 
driven by asset prices and collateral, whereby asset prices drive credit availability both in the 
upturn and the downturn, but real economic effects are particularly strong in the downturn.  
Estimation results for the model based on time series data 
Turning to the OLS estimation of equations for real credit growth using macro data, they are 
consistent with a marked effect of asset prices as well as GDP on credit. In more detail, 
results of the fixed-effects panel estimation of equation (1) without an error correction term 
(ECT) are shown in Table 17.10 Table 17 presents 5 different specifications, ranking from 
general (Model 1) to specific (Model 5). The lag-length specification for the right-hand-side 
variables was statistically determined—based on the significance of the corresponding 
lagged-variables, the Akaike information criterion, and the structure of the residuals of the 
regression. According to the model selection criteria, Model 5 is the “preferred” 
specification. In Model 5, the variables have the expected qualitative effect on the growth of 
credit: GDP and the housing price index have a positive and significant effect on credit; the 
acceleration term on the housing price index has a positive and significant effect on credit (at 
the 90 percent confidence level). The real interest rate has a positive and significant effect on 
credit, consistent with the demand side effect. However, credit growth falls with an increase 
in the real interest rate in period (t-1), the effect is also statistically significant. Additionally, 
an increase in last year’s real interest rate (t-4) has a negative effect on credit growth. Note 
                                                 
9
 The results of the Johansen cointegration analysis are available from the author upon request. 
10
 The panel includes Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Thailand for the period 1960:1 to 2004:3 (only for a small sub-sample of countries a full time 
series is available including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). 
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that the real interest rate in (t-2) and (t-3) are not significant and were dropped from Model 5. 
BIN as well as all of its lagged values were not found statistically significant in any of the 
model specifications, hence they were dropped—with no qualitative impact on the estimates 
of the rest of the equation. 
Lagged values of the dependent variable were also included in the specification in order to 
account for the autocorrelation structure observed in the credit data.11 It is interesting to see 
how lag (t-4), i.e., last year’s value, has a relatively large and significant negative effect on 
the current period growth rate, which could be interpreted as banks making credit growth 
decisions for next year based on current credit portfolio conditions. In other words, when 
banks experience a period of significant credit expansion, they may tend to cut next year’s 
private credit growth. 
Table 18 shows the fixed effect panel estimates for a sub-sample of countries: Australia, 
Hong Kong SAR, Japan, South Korea and Singapore. The sub-sample was selected based on 
those countries where (i) a long enough time series was available to perform cointegration 
analysis and (ii) evidence of long-run cointegration was found. Table 18 presents three model 
specifications: Model 1 shows a similar specification to that of Model 5 in Table 17—
without the error correction term. The effect of all the variables is qualitatively similar to that 
of Model 5 in Table 18, with the exception of the fourth lag of the real interest rate which 
turned out to be statistically insignificant and dropped from the specification. Model 2 adds 
an ECT to Model 1. The ECT has a negative effect as expected, but it turns out not to be 
statistically significant. To investigate whether mean reversion takes place in a non linear 
fashion, the square of the ECT (“ECT^2”) is added to the specification in Model 3. The 
results show that “ECT^2” has a negative and significant effect on credit growth, suggesting 
that large deviations of real credit from its long-run determinants tends to have a 
comparatively larger effect on credit growth (i.e., tend to be absorbed relatively faster) 
relative to smaller deviations from long-run equilibrium.  
                                                 
11
 The optimal lag structure (5 lags) was based on the analysis of the residuals and the Akaike information 
criterion. 
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Table 1. Determinants of Credit Growth, Panel Estimation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DLGDP(t) 0.1480 0.0919 0.0965 0.0954 0.1022 
 0.0105 0.0160 0.0067 0.0073 0.0036 
DLGDP(t-1) -0.1190     
 0.1058     
DLGDP(t-2) 0.0960     
 0.1889     
DLGDP(t-3) -0.0239     
 0.7416     
DLGDP(t-4) 0.0965     
 0.0919     
DLRHP(t) 0.0272 0.0321 0.0266 0.0263 0.0285 
 0.0412 0.0215 0.0061 0.0064 0.0025 
DLRHP(t)-DLRHP(t-1) 0.0205 0.0246 0.0193 0.0204 0.0199 
 0.1203 0.0859 0.0915 0.0728 0.0729 
DLRHP(t-2) -0.0115 -0.0147    
 0.4446 0.3633    
DLRHP(t-3) 0.0050 0.0050    
 0.7295 0.7463    
DLRHP(t-4) 0.0046 0.0170    
 0.7469 0.2484    
RIN(t) 0.4080 0.4113 0.4199 0.4261 0.4227 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RIN(t-1) -0.1542 -0.2184 -0.2248 -0.2303 -0.2301 
 0.2225 0.0696 0.0517 0.0137 0.0122 
RIN(t-2) -0.1166 -0.0662 -0.0769   
 0.3492 0.5774 0.5009   
RIN(t-3) 0.1725 0.1782 0.1636   
 0.1607 0.1287 0.1482   
RIN(t-4) -0.1959 -0.2033 -0.1898 -0.1043 -0.0944 
 0.0274 0.0168 0.0205 0.0408 0.0591 
DLRCR(t-1) 0.9977 1.0145 1.0174 1.0160 0.9685 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DLRCR(t-2) 0.0332 0.0294 0.0258 0.0225 0.0777 
 0.6133 0.6521 0.6854 0.7183 0.1360 
DLRCR(t-3) -0.0747 -0.0920 -0.0863 -0.0697 -0.0447 
 0.2198 0.1274 0.1400 0.2254 0.3878 
DLRCR(t-4) -0.5432 -0.5235 -0.5076 -0.5127 -0.5161 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DLRCR(t-5) 0.5189 0.5231 0.5187 0.5056 0.3818 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DLRCR(t-6) -0.0657 -0.0804 -0.0809 -0.0718  
 0.3073 0.2038 0.1853 0.2370  
DLRCR(t-7) -0.0523 -0.0402 -0.0409 -0.0423  
 0.2252 0.3418 0.3222 0.3047  
      
R-squared 0.8317 0.8272 0.8264 0.8254 0.8217 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8227 0.8191 0.8195 0.8192 0.8160 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.2005 2.2045 2.1964 2.2038 2.0877 
      
Source: Staff own estimates. The panel includes Australia, HK, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand. It covers the period 1960:1 to 2004:2, however 
only in a few countries, including Australia, Japan and New Zealand, a complete time series was 
available. See Appendix 1 for variables definition. The figures under the coefficient estimates are 
p-values; a p-value below 0.05 indicates significance at a 95 percent confidence level. The panel 
also includes country-specific fixed-effects. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Credit Growth, Panel Estimation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ECT(t-1)  -0.0021 -0.0064 
  0.7487 0.3680 
ECT(t-1)^2   -0.0246 
   0.0477 
DLGDP(t) 0.0760 0.0803 0.0752 
 0.0126 0.0113 0.0187 
DLRHP(t) 0.0516 0.0439 0.0414 
 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 
DLRHP(t)-DLRHP(t-1) 0.0850 0.0731 0.0668 
 0.0004 0.0064 0.0117 
RIN(t) 0.4244 0.4355 0.4044 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RIN(t-1) -0.3381 -0.3098 -0.2841 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 
DLRCR(t-1) 0.9844 0.9593 0.9614 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DLRCR(t-4) -0.4447 -0.4451 -0.4464 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DLRCR(t-5) 0.3186 0.3111 0.3202 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    
R-squared 0.8970 0.8963 0.8978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8943 0.8932 0.8946 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.8581 1.8372 1.8540 
 
Source: Staff own estimates. The panel includes Australia, HK, Japan, South 
Korea, and Singapore (those countries for which (i) an adequate time-series 
length was available and (ii) evidence of cointegration was found).  It covers 
the period 1960:1 to 2004:2, however only in a few countries, including 
Australia and Japan, a complete time series was available. See Appendix 1 for 
variables definition. The figures under the coefficient estimates are p-values; a 
p-value below 0.05 indicates significance at a 95 percent confidence level. The 
panel also includes country-specific fixed-effects. 
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APPENDIX II: PROPERTY PRICES AND CREDIT GROWTH AND RISKS TO FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
 
As is well known, sustained credit growth and large increases in asset prices appear not just 
to contribute to pro-cyclicality, as demonstrated above, but also to increase the probability of 
financial instability. This has led to research into the behavior of credit and asset prices to 
assess whether significant deviations from their trend values can be used as indicators of the 
risk of a financial crisis.  
1.   Identifying Crisis Thresholds 
 
Borio and Lowe (2002) propose a methodology to detect future financial sector problems by 
examining the behavior of credit and asset prices. The approach—building upon the work of 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)—consists of a threshold analysis for financial indicators. The 
framework proposes that deviations of credit and asset prices above a threshold constitutes an 
“early warning” for the policy maker, signaling potential financial-sector vulnerabilities in 
the near future. Two indicators are considered: the ratio of credit to GDP and the ratio of 
stock market index to the CPI.12 The threshold values of these indicators are computed using 
an algorithm that minimizes the noise to signal ratio—i.e., the ratio of Type II errors to one 
minus the size of Type I error, for a given level of Type I error.13 It is reported that the lowest 
noise to signal ratio in forecasting financial crises over a 3-year forecast horizon is 
accomplished in the event of coincident signals by the two variables (rather than each one 
separately). Based on a cross-section of 34 countries for the period 1960 to 1999, it is 
estimated that credit gaps (gaps above long-run trend) of about 4 to 5 percent and asset price 
gaps of about 40 to 50 percent provide the best threshold combination to project future 
problems in the financial system.  
2.   Methodology 
The Borio and Lowe methodology uses two financial indicators, the credit to GDP ratio and 
real asset prices (i.e., the ratio of stock market index to CPI). With the help of time series 
techniques, we separate trend from cycle in order to assess whether there is evidence of 
“excessive” deviations in the actual series from their long-term trend. “Excessive” deviations 
are defined as movements beyond the B&L thresholds. In separating trend and cycle in the 
credit to GDP series, we take the following steps:  
• Step 1: An ARIMA model is fitted to the series, as well as to its seasonal 
component—provided that a seasonal component is present in the quarterly series. 
                                                 
12
 Borio and Lowe (2002) also add the investment gap, however, it makes no significant improvement in the 
forecasting ability of the indicators: although it reduces marginally the noise to signal ratio, it also reduces the 
number of crises that are correctly predicted. 
13
 Type I error are the percentage of financial distress that are not correctly predicted. Type II error are the 
percent of non-crisis periods in which a crisis is incorrectly signaled. An indicator is consider to successfully 
signal a crisis if it is “on” in the year of the crisis.  
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• Step 2: A Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied to the fitted ARIMA specification with a 
conventional smoothing parameter of 1,600 for quarterly data. 
• Step 3: The percentage deviation of the seasonally adjusted series from its trend is 
computed. Values above 5 percent are considered a signal of a vulnerable financial 
system to future financial distress. 
The process of separating cycle from trend in the real asset price is less complex, as the asset 
price series are well-approximated by a random walk. Thus, there is no need for ARIMA 
modeling or seasonal adjustment, and a Hodrick-Prescott filter can be directly applied to the 
real asset price series. The deviation from trend is computed as the percentage difference of 
the actual series from the trend. Values above 50 percent are considered a signal of a 
vulnerable financial system. 
 
3.   Episodes of Rapid Credit Growth and Sharp Asset Price Changes 
 
The existence of significant credit and asset price gaps in recent periods is investigated in the 
following East Asian countries: Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The sample covers the period 
1960:1 to 2004:3. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 1, which presents 
deviations of the credit and asset price series from their long-term trend (i.e., credit and asset 
price gaps). In Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand, both the credit and asset price gaps are within the Borio and Lowe 
threshold—although Thailand’s credit gap of 3.5 percent appears to be on a rising trend. 
There are two cases in which either one or both of the indicators are above the threshold. In 
Hong Kong SAR, the credit gap is 6.2 percent, however there is no evidence in recent 
periods of large asset price gaps. In Indonesia, both a sizeable credit gap of 25 percent and a 
moderate asset price gap of 55 percent are above the respective thresholds. The asset price 
increase seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon, as there is no evidence of excessive 
positive gaps in the recent periods.14 
 
Overall, based on the credit and asset price gap analysis, there appears to be no evidence of 
significant growing vulnerabilities for the sample of countries considered, with the exception 
of Indonesia. However, caution is needed in interpreting these results. First, the threshold 
used for this analysis may not be the best suited to the sample of countries in this paper. 
Borio and Lowe (2002) used a broader sample of 34 countries (which excluded the 
Philippines). Although the methodology provides a common threshold for the entire cross-
section of countries, there may be country-specific or regional-specific differences. Second, 
their calibration of the thresholds was based on annual data (for the period 1960 to 1999) 
while we use quarterly data. Third, the methodology give only a “zero/one” signal, however, 
the size of the credit gap and the asset price gap matters so an upward trend in those gaps that 
remains below the threshold corresponds to growing vulnerabilities (Figure 1). 
                                                 
14
 For the case of Indonesia, given the relatively short length of the time series, the estimation of the trend and 
cycle may suffer from a short-sample bias. 
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APPENDIX III: DATA AND ADDITIONAL REGRESSIONS 
 
 Appendix Table 1. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP—
Cyclical Asymmetries Since 1990 
 
Boom  
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.01 0.20 
China -0.05 -0.34 
Hong Kong SAR -0.57 -0.67 
Indonesia 0.01 0.48 
Japan 0.88 0.99 
Korea 0.56 0.71 
Malaysia 0.05 0.12 
New Zealand -0.22 -0.14 
Philippines 0.24 0.34 
Singapore 0.35 0.09 
Thailand 0.33 0.55 
Average 0.14 0.21 
Recession  
(growth below average) 
  
Australia 0.71 0.37 
China 0.13 -0.02 
Hong Kong SAR 0.42 0.72 
Indonesia 0.90 0.19 
Japan 0.25 0.31 
Korea -0.39 0.52 
Malaysia 0.52 0.35 
New Zealand 0.12 0.26 
Philippines 0.19 0.56 
Singapore 0.79 0.05 
Thailand 0.31 -0.30 
Average 0.36 0.27 
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 Appendix Table 2. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of Real GDP—
Cyclical Asymmetries since 1990 
 
Boom 
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices 
Australia 0.03 0.06 
China   
Hong Kong SAR -0.39 -0.59 
Indonesia 0.15 -0.37 
Japan 0.17 0.99 
Korea 0.33 0.56 
Malaysia 0.92  
New Zealand 0.20 0.21 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.22 0.44 
Thailand -0.20 -0.30 
Average 0.16 0.13 
Recession  
(Growth Below Average) 
  
Australia 0.04 0.30 
China   
Hong Kong SAR 0.07 0.78 
Indonesia -0.11 0.95 
Japan -0.27 0.20 
Korea -0.20 0.52 
Malaysia -0.06 0.81 
New Zealand 0.12 0.25 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.04 0.65 
Thailand -0.08 0.63 
Average -0.05 0.57 
 
Note: all equations include country dummies—not reported in detail. * and ** indicate 
significance at 90 percent and 95 percent respectively. 
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 Appendix Table 3. Correlation Coefficients with Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real House Prices—Cyclical Asymmetries since 1990 
 
Boom  
(Growth Exceeding Average) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit (+4) 
Fourth Difference of Log of 
Real Credit 
Australia 0.30 0.22 
China   
Hong Kong SAR -0.91 0.94 
Indonesia -0.20 -0.50 
Japan -0.99 -0.24 
Korea 0.15 0.14 
Malaysia   
New Zealand -0.07 -0.04 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.04 0.05 
Thailand -0.33 -0.79 
Average -0.25 -0.03 
Recession 
(Growth Below Average) 
  
Australia 0.06 -0.06 
China   
Hong Kong SAR 0.20 0.29 
Indonesia -0.57 0.55 
Japan -0.16 0.18 
Korea -0.01 0.30 
Malaysia -0.61 0.26 
New Zealand 0.00 0.32 
Philippines   
Singapore 0.17 0.07 
Thailand -0.75 0.65 
Average -0.19 0.28 
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 Appendix Table 4. Number of Banks per Country 
 
Country Number of banks Of which foreign 
Australia 12 4 
China 24 3 
Hong Kong SAR 17 9 
Indonesia 17 9 
Japan 102 1 
Korea 15 2 
Malaysia 20 10 
New Zealand 5 4 
Philippines 15 4 
Singapore 4 1 
Thailand 9 2 
Total 242 49 
 
 Appendix Table 5. Characteristics of the Bankscope Sample 
 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Loan/asset ratio 1579 61.00 13.80 10.0 90.0 
Loan growth 1330 5.80 20.40 -99.5 99.3 
Asset margin 1576 0.47 4.55 -47.0 9.4 
Unadjusted capital ratio 1589 7.65 8.48 -84.0 100.0 
St funding/assets 1586 82.10 13.50 0.5 173.0 
EBDTA/assets 1455 1.30 1.73 -14.5 16.8 
Provisions/assets 1455 0.97 2.74 -8.9 67.8 
Memo: ROAA 1584 0.17 2.95 -70.7 8.8 
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 Appendix Table 6. Equations for Loan Growth 
 
Independent 
variables 
(1) 
Macro 
only 
(2) 
+Standard 
micro 
(3) 
+Property 
shares 
(4) 
+Exchange 
rate 
(5) 
+Japan 
dummy 
(6) 
+Interbank 
flow 
(7) 
+”Since 
bust” 
(8) 
+Owner- 
ship 
Constant -3.7 
(1.0) 
4.3 
(0.6) 
-8.0 
(1.1) 
-7.0 
(1.1) 
 
-7.9 
(1.1) 
-7.7 
(1.1) 
-8.3 
(1.2) 
-13.0 
(1.8) 
Macro indicators         
GDP growth 1.03** 
(6.4) 
1.1** 
(7.2) 
1.1** 
(7.4) 
0.96** 
(5.5) 
0.96** 
(5.4) 
0.87** 
(5.0) 
0.75** 
(4.4) 
0.74** 
(4.4) 
Inflation -1.5** 
(8.4) 
-1.2** 
(6.7) 
0.12 
(0.5) 
0.098 
(0.4) 
0.11 
(0.4) 
0.14 
(0.5) 
-0.07 
(0.2) 
-0.06 
(0.2) 
Interest rate 0.46** 
(2.7) 
0.48** 
(2.7) 
0.51* 
(1.8) 
0.72** 
(2.2) 
0.75** 
(2.3) 
0.55** 
(1.6) 
1.1** 
(3.4) 
1.2** 
(5.3) 
Bank indicators         
Loan/Asset (-1)  -0.19** 
(3.7) 
-0.13** 
(2.3) 
-0.13** 
(2.4) 
-0.13** 
(2.4) 
-0.12** 
(2.3) 
-0.12** 
(2.2) 
-0.12** 
(2.2) 
Asset margin (-1)  0.69** 
(5.7) 
0.09 
(0.2) 
0.13 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.2) 
0.12 
(0.3) 
0.11 
(1.3) 
0.14 
(0.4) 
Capital ratio (-1)  0.13 
(1.2) 
0.32** 
(2.0) 
0.31* 
(1.9) 
0.31* 
(1.9) 
0.32** 
(2.0) 
0.36** 
(2.2) 
0.45** 
(2.7) 
St funding/ Assets  
(-1) 
 0.02 
(0.5) 
0.08 
(1.3) 
0.08 
(1.3) 
0.08 
(1.4) 
0.09 
(1.5) 
0.07 
(1.2) 
0.07 
(1.2) 
Additional variables         
Property share 
relative 
  0.07** 
(3.3) 
0.093** 
(3.5) 
0.076** 
(2.4) 
0.09** 
(2.7) 
0.05* 
(1.6) 
0.05* 
(1.7) 
Change in USD rate    -0.083 
(1.4) 
-0.12* 
(1.7) 
-0.08 
(1.1) 
-0.11* 
(1.7) 
-0.11* 
(1.7) 
Japan 
dummy*DUSD 
    0.1 
(1.0) 
0.04 
(0.4) 
0.17* 
(1.6) 
0.17* 
(1.6) 
Change real 
interbank (USD) 
     0.04** 
(2.5) 
0.06** 
(3.5) 
0.06** 
(3.5) 
Years since last 
“bust” 
      1.03** 
(4.2) 
1.05** 
(4.3) 
Domestic ownership        6.3** 
(2.9) 
Obs 1326 1300 1094 1093 1092 1093 1030 1029 
R2 0.285 0.3 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 
   
Note: All equations include country dummies—not reported in detail.  
  * and ** indicate significance at 90 percent and 95 percent respectively. 
If lagged provision ratio is added to equation (3), the coefficient is –0.73 and the t-value (4.1) 
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 Appendix Table 7. Equations for Bank Margin over Short Rate 
 
Independent 
variables 
(1) 
Macro 
only 
(2) 
+Standard 
micro 
(3) 
+Property 
shares 
(4) 
+Exchange 
rate 
(5) 
+Japan 
dummy 
(6) 
+Inter-
bank 
flow 
(7) 
+”Since 
bust” 
(8) 
+Owner- 
ship 
Constant 4.7** 
(11.7) 
1.5** 
(2.0) 
2.3** 
(5.2) 
2.2** 
(5.1) 
2.2** 
(5.1) 
2.3** 
(5.3) 
2.0** 
(4.8) 
2.3** 
(5.2) 
Macro 
indicators 
        
GDP growth -
0.03** 
(2.7) 
-0.08** 
(5.8) 
-0.052** 
(5.7) 
-0.034** 
(3.2) 
-0.04** 
(3.2) 
-0.028** 
(2.7) 
-0.014 
(1.4) 
-0.014 
(1.4) 
Inflation 0.05** 
(3.3) 
0.1** 
(4.9) 
0.072** 
(3.9) 
0.081** 
(4.3) 
0.079** 
(4.2) 
0.074** 
(4.0) 
0.13** 
(6.9) 
0.13** 
(6.9) 
Interest rate -0.7** 
(50.8) 
-0.61** 
(31.7) 
-0.41** 
(23.5) 
-0.45** 
(21.9) 
-0.45** 
(21.8) 
-0.45** 
(22.6) 
-0.49** 
(24.6) 
-0.49** 
(24.6) 
Bank indicators         
Loan/Asset (-1)  0.031** 
(5.6) 
0.027** 
(8.1) 
0.028** 
(8.3) 
0.028** 
(8.3) 
0.027** 
(8.1) 
0.025** 
(7.6) 
0.025** 
(7.7) 
Loan growth  
(-1) 
 -0.009** 
(5.2) 
-0.003** 
(2.0) 
-0.004** 
(2.5) 
-
0.004** 
(2.5) 
-0.003** 
(2.0) 
-
0.004** 
(2.5) 
-0.004** 
(2.3) 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
 -0.007 
(0.8) 
-0.015 
(1.3) 
-0.013 
(1.2) 
-0.013 
(1.1) 
-0.014 
(1.2) 
-0.01 
(0.9) 
-0.014 
(1.2) 
St funding/ 
Assets (-1) 
 0.012** 
(2.2) 
-0.004 
(1.0) 
-0.004 
(1.0) 
-0.0038 
(1.1) 
-0.0043 
(1.2) 
0.001 
(0.2) 
0.001 
(0.3) 
Additional 
variables 
        
Property share 
relative 
  -0.002 
(1.5) 
-0.005** 
(3.0) 
-
0.004** 
(2.3) 
-0.007** 
(3.8) 
-
0.004** 
(2.0) 
-0.004** 
(2.1) 
Change in USD 
rate 
   0.011** 
(3.3) 
0.012** 
(3.2) 
0.008** 
(2.2) 
0.009** 
(2.6) 
0.009** 
(2.6) 
Japan 
dummy*DUSD 
    -0.004 
(0.8) 
0.005 
(0.9) 
-0.003 
(0.5) 
-0.003 
(0.4) 
Change real 
interbank 
(USD) 
     -
0.0062** 
(6.2) 
-
0.006** 
(5.6) 
-0.006** 
(5.6) 
Years since last 
“bust” 
      -
0.091** 
(5.9) 
-0.091** 
(5.9) 
Domestic 
ownership 
       -0.31** 
(2.5) 
Obs 1562 1057 888 887 886 885 840 839 
R2 0.86 0.88 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.76 
  
 Note: All equations include country dummies—not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 percent 
and 95 percent respectively. 
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 Appendix Table 8. Equations for Bank Provisioning Rate 
Independent 
variables 
(1) 
Macro 
only 
(2) 
+Standard 
micro 
(3) 
+Property 
shares 
(4) 
+Exchange 
rate 
(5) 
+Japan 
dummy 
(6) 
+Inter-
bank 
flow 
(7) 
+”Since 
bust” 
(8) 
+Owner- 
ship 
Constant 1.7** 
(4.0) 
0.2 
(0.1) 
1.2** 
(2.3) 
1.2** 
(2.3) 
1.2** 
(2.3) 
1.3** 
(2.4) 
1.8** 
(3.5) 
1.8** 
(3.5) 
Macro 
indicators 
        
GDP growth -
0.06** 
(2.9) 
-0.002** 
(0.1) 
-0.06** 
(4.6) 
-0.04** 
(3.2) 
-0.04** 
(2.9) 
-0.04** 
(2.6) 
-0.03** 
(2.3) 
-0.03** 
(2.3) 
Inflation 0.13** 
(5.2) 
0.1** 
(2.4) 
0.03 
(1.2) 
0.04 
(1.4) 
0.05* 
(1.8) 
0.04 
(1.4) 
0.05* 
(1.7) 
0.05* 
(1.7) 
Interest rate 0.08** 
(3.5) 
0.15** 
(3.9) 
0.11** 
(4.6) 
0.09** 
(3.2) 
0.1** 
(3.5) 
0.09** 
(3.2) 
0.033 
(1.2) 
0.033 
(1.2) 
Bank indicators         
Loan/Asset (-1)  0.04** 
(4.2) 
0.02** 
(4.8) 
0.021** 
(4.9) 
0.02** 
(4.8) 
0.02** 
(4.7) 
0.02** 
(3.8) 
0.02** 
(3.8) 
Loan growth  
(-1) 
 -0.007* 
(1.6) 
-0.01** 
(4.7) 
-0.01** 
(4.8) 
-0.01** 
(4.8) 
-0.01** 
(4.5) 
-0.01** 
(4.1) 
-0.008** 
(4.1) 
Asset margin  
(-1) 
 0.012 
(0.6) 
-0.007 
(0.2) 
-0.01 
(0.3) 
-0.03 
(0.8) 
-0.03 
(1.0) 
-0.05 
(1.5) 
-0.05 
(1.5) 
Capital ratio  
(-1) 
 0.055** 
(2.5) 
-0.02 
(1.5) 
-0.02 
(1.4) 
-0.02 
(1.3) 
-0.02 
(1.3) 
-0.005 
(0.4) 
-0.005 
(0.4) 
St funding/ 
Assets (-1) 
 -0.02* 
(1.8) 
-0.008* 
(1.9) 
-0.008* 
(1.9) 
-0.007* 
(1.6) 
-0.008* 
(1.7) 
-0.006 
(1.4) 
-0.006 
(1.4) 
EBDTA 
(-1) 
 0.08 
(1.3) 
-0.1** 
(2.2) 
-0.1** 
(2.2) 
-0.11** 
(2.5) 
-0.12** 
(2.7) 
-0.15** 
(3.4) 
-0.15** 
(3.4) 
Additional 
variables 
        
Property share 
relative 
  0.001 
(0.5) 
-0.001 
(0.4) 
-
0.005** 
(2.1) 
-
0.007** 
(2.9) 
-0.004* 
(1.7) 
-0.004* 
(1.7) 
Change in USD 
rate 
   0.007** 
(1.6) 
-0.0003 
(0.1) 
-0.003 
(0.5) 
-0.001 
(0.0) 
-0.001 
(0.0) 
Japan 
dummy*DUSD 
    0.03** 
(3.4) 
0.03** 
(4.0) 
0.02** 
(2.3) 
0.02** 
(2.3) 
Change real 
interbank 
(USD) 
     -
0.004** 
(3.2) 
-0.002* 
(1.8) 
-0.002* 
(1.8) 
Years since last 
“bust” 
      -0.18** 
(8.9) 
-0.18** 
(9.0) 
Domestic 
ownership 
       0.001 
(0.1) 
Obs 1441 965 813 812 811 810 808 807 
R2 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.28 
 
Note: All equations include country dummies—not reported in detail. * and ** indicate significance at 90 percent 
and 95 percent respectively. 
 - 55 -  
 
 
Appendix Table 9: Equations Excluding Japan 
 
Independent variables Loan Growth Asset Margin Provisioning 
Constant -3.4 
(0.3) 
2.1** 
(2.9) 
1.3** 
(1.4) 
Macro indicators    
GDP growth 0.7** 
(3.0) 
-0.014 
(1.0) 
-0.04** 
(2.3) 
Inflation -0.05 
(0.1) 
0.13** 
(5.3) 
0.035 
(1.0) 
Interest rate 1.24** 
(2.8) 
-0.49** 
(18.7) 
0.034 
(1.0) 
Bank indicators    
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.16* 
(1.9) 
0.026** 
(5.7) 
0.018** 
(3.0) 
Loan growth (-1)  -0.0029 
(1.4) 
-0.009** 
(3.5) 
Asset margin (-1) 0.16 
(0.3) 
 -0.06* 
(1.6) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.33 
(1.4) 
-0.009 
(0.6) 
0.0012 
(0.1) 
St funding/ Assets (-1) -0.013 
(0.1) 
0.0013 
(0.2) 
-0.0002 
(0.1) 
EBDTA/Assets (-1)   -0.21** 
(3.2) 
Additional variables    
Property share relative 0.06 
(1.1) 
0.001 
(0.3) 
-0.0045 
(1.3) 
Change in USD rate -0.12 
(1.5) 
0.009* 
(1.9) 
-0.0007 
(0.1) 
Change real interbank 
(USD) 
0.05** 
(2.3) 
-0.006** 
(4.1) 
-0.0011 
(0.6) 
Years since last “bust” 1.17** 
(2.9) 
-0.12** 
(4.9) 
-0.19** 
(6.0) 
Domestic ownership 6.8** 
(2.4) 
-0.31** 
(2.0) 
-0.001 
(0.1) 
Observations 596 468 452 
R2 0.18 0.76 0.25 
 
Note: * and ** indicate significance at 90 percent and 95 percent respectively. 
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